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EDITORIAL 
Pembaca yang budiman, 
EDITORIAL i i  
Segala puji dan ungkapan rasa syukur hanya tertuju kepada 
Allah SWT, sehingga atas perkenanNYA jualah maka JURNAL H UKUM 
HUMANITER ini dapat kembali terbit di tengah-tengah para pembaca 
sekal ian . 
Edisi in i  berisi a rtikel utama yang masih memaparkan ulasan 
mengenai konsep dan masalah-masalah yang dihadapi dalam kontra­
insurgensi dalam perang geri lya, serta masih meninjau mengenai 
sengketa-sengketa bersenjata yang berlangsung di dalam wilayah 
suatu negara, baik pada tingkat atau level yang lebih rendah seperti 
konfl i k-konfl i k  yang bersifat horizonta l di Indonesia, maupu n  
mengenai pasukan pemberontak seperti Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, yang 
ditinjau berdasarkan  hukum humaniter. Adapun sebagai artikel 
pendukung, akan disaj ikan ulasan mengenai metode dan cara 
berperang khususnya dalam peperangan di laut. Di samping itu, kal i  
in i  untuk pertama ka l inya dikemukakan bahasan mengenai Pasukan 
Pemeliharaan Perdamaian, sebagai suatu topik yang berada dalam 
tataran ' ius ad bel lum'; untuk melengkapi pembahasan-pembahasan 
mengenai 'ius in bel lo' sebagaimana telah dipaparkan dalam edisi­
edisi yang terdahulu .  
Adapun sebagai isi "Kolom': dipaparkan sejumlah perkembangan 
yang terjadi pada Mahkamah Pidana Internasional ( International 
Criminal Court), semoga dapat menjadi masukan bagi para pembaca 
mengenai perkembangan terakhir yang terjadi dalam Mahkamah 
tersebut. 
Atas terlaksananya penerbitan JURNAL HUKUM HUMANITER edisi 
ka l i  in i ,  kam i  mengucapkan terima kasih kepada International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), ya ng  teta p m e njaga 
komitmennya dalam pengembangan hukum humaniter d i  tanah air. 
Akhirnya kami mengharapkan tulisan dari ka langan masyarakat 
pemerhati hukum humaniter, dan juga masukan dari pembaca berupa 
kritik maupun saran konstruktif lainnya . Selamat membaca .  
Redaksi 
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INSURGENCY AND COU NTER INSURGENCY 
SOM E  CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS 
Nils Marius Rekkedal 1 
Abstract 
This article is the second of three articles which present a nd 
discuss several of the key concepts in use when attempting, in a 
research or mil itary context (e.g., in doctrines a nd regulations), 
to describe the different forms of insurgency. One of the 
assumptions in this work has been that al l  insurgent wars are 
different, with their own local or regional conditions. The author 
has also said that it should nevertheless be possible to try to 
find certain basic characteristics in these forms of warfare. We 
can also find in this article some of the key concepts and problems 
regard ing insurgency, g uerri l la  wa rfa re and methods of 
insurgency as well .  
C. Counter- Insurgency 
1. Introduction 
An overview of various 'classic' and more recent special ist 
l iterature concerning insurgency and counter-insurgency is necessary 
if we are to study this special ist area . Despite the fact that the US is 
probably the nation in the world that has most experience of counter­
insurgency in modern times,2 reports from Iraq suggest that they 
perhaps sti l l  have a lot to learn . This has unfortunately been fu l ly 
demonstrated in  the aftermath of the war in  Iraq in  the spring of 
1 Nils Marius Rekkedal is Professor War Studies, especially Military Theory, at the Swedish 
National Defence College, Stockholm. 
2When it comes to the amount of experience from different insurgencies, the US is probably 
superior. On the other hand, several countries have fought against 'their' insurgent movements 
for a great number of years, e.g. ,  Colombia, Burma and Israel. 
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2003. It has proved difficult in practice for the American forces, with 
support from smaller allied contingents, to 'eliminate' the many, only 
partly organised insurgent groups in the country. This has gone on 
at the same time as attempting to build up confidence among the 
relatively fragmented Iraqi population and at a time when the 
Americans also had a clear desire to play down their role as an 
occupying power. Although the new Iraqi Government is now 
attempting to build up its own forces, it has taken time to establish 
new local and competent security forces. 3 
The French counter-insurgency expert and military theorist David 
Galula wrote, 40 years ago, something that is still topical today. This 
is how it sounds in an American translation. 
Since antagonizing the population will not help, it is imperative that 
hardships for it and rash actions on the part of the forces be kept to 
a minimum. The units participating in the operations should be 
thoroughly indoctrinated to that effect, with misdeeds punished 
severely and even publicly if this can serve to impress the population. 
Any damage done should be immediately compensated without 
red tape.4 
And without getting the majority of the population behind you, 
there is hardly any hope of a victory for more moderate forces. Galula 
also made another important observation - ordinary people by and 
large want to live in peace and this means that if one must (or is 
forced to) take sides in a conflict, one will support what the side one 
assumes will be the winner! He worded his observation in the following 
manner: Those fighting the insurgency will not be able to achieve 
broad popular support until the majority of people are convinced 
that those fighting the insurgency have the will, the resources and 
the ability to win. This is a natural way of thinking, given the risk a 
person opting for the wrong side is taking. It could quite simply cost 
him his life. Ordinary propaganda is not enough to get a careful 
person to take sides against the insurgents.5 On the basis of his own 
3 At the end of this text, there is a short overview of this type of specialist literature. 
• David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Frederick A.  
Praeger Publishers, second printing, 1 965), pp.  1 08-1 09. 
5 Thomas E .  Ricks, "Excerpt: A 1 964 Classic's Lessons for Iraq in 2005", The Washington 
Post, 1 7  July 2005, p. BWOB. 
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experiences in  the period from 1956-1958 during the Algerian War,6 
he stated that, without popular support, a peaceful solution based 
on a non-radical social order would be difficult to achieve. 
In many ways, Galula was describing a clearly perpetual feature of 
insurgency when he stated that disorder is cheap to create and very 
costly to prevent. 7 
A relatively simple theoretical construct underlies the theory and 
practice of counter-insurgency warfare. It is the essence of what 
today's theorists and strategists term asvmmetricwarfare:  although 
an asymmetric distribution of resources and abilities actually favours 
counterinsurgent forces. they are often inappropriately wielded. The 
conflict is asymmetric because there is a :  "( . . .  ) disproportion of 
strength between the opponents at the outset. and from the difference 
in essence between their assets and liabil ities."8 
At the conceptual level, "the insurgent has a formidable asset - the 
ideological power of a cause on which to base his actions. The 
counterinsurgent has a heavy l iabi l ity - he is responsible for 
maintaining order throughout the country': without undermining the 
ideals on which the new government is making its pleas for support. 9 
•David Galula was a lieutenant colonel in the French Armed Forces (died 1 967). In his book, 
he has created a synthesis of his experiences as a soldier in places like China (where he 
was taken prisoner by Maoist guerrillas), Algeria and Indochina in such a way that his work 
stands as an overall theory with regard to so-called 'counter-insurgency'. The actual core of 
his theory is his description of how an area/country can be divided up into smaller controllable 
parts and then military forces can be used to defeat the insurgents there. But an important 
point was that. at the same time as carrying out the military operations, it was necessary to 
use political measures aimed at the civilian community and to reinforce the civilian structures. 
Once the insurgents were defeated or had fled from the area now controlled by the mil itary 
forces, it was the new civilian administration's most important task to ensure that the 
insurgency did not re-emerge. Once stability was achieved in the 'liberated' area, the military 
and civilian structures could be moved to the next area. The same operational pattern would 
then be carried out here. 
7 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare., pp. 74-81. 
"Ibid., p. 6. 
9 Ibid., p. 7. 
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Component Insurgent 
Resource asymmetry Limited resources/power 
Objective = population Solicit government 
oppression 
Political nature of war Wage war for minds 
of population 
Gradual transition to Use time to develop cause 
war 
Protracted nature of Disperse; use limited 
war violence widely 
Cost High return for investment 
Role of ideology Sole asset at beginning 
is cause or idea 
Counter-insurgent 
Preponderance of 
resources/power 
Show that insurgency 
is destabilizing 
Wage war for minds of 
population, 
and to keep legitimacy 
Always in reactive mode 
Maintain vigilance; 
sustain will 
Sustained operations carry 
high political/economic 
burden 
Defeat root of 
cause or idea 
An possible interpretation of David Galula's view of differences between 
insurgents and counterinsurgents, based on his Chapter 5 and 6.10 (The 
concept for this table, see 11). 
The figure above shows some of the possible differences that 
David Galula saw between insurgents and counter- insurgents. 
Exploring the practical implications of those dyadic relationships is 
the underlying theme of Galula's mil itary writings, which reinforce 
the image of counterinsurgency as a 'special' war: 
Revolutionary war, ( . . .  ), represents an exceptional case not only 
because, as we suspect, it has its special rules, different from those 
of the conventional war, but also because most of the rules applicable 
to one side do not work for the other. In a fight between a fly and 
a lion, the fly cannot deliver a knockout blow and the lion cannot 
fly. It is the same war for both camps in terms of space and time, 
yet there are two distinct warfare's - the revolutionary's and, shall 
we say, the counterrevolutionary's. 
10 Ibid., Chapter 5, pp. 70-86, and Chapter 6, pp. 87-106. 
11 Robert R. Tomes, 'Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare', Parameters, Spring 2004, 
http://carlislewww.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/04spring/tomes.htm 
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This is where Mao Tse Tung is misleading. What he calls "the laws 
of revolutionary war" are in fact those of the revolutionary side, his 
side. The one who directs a war against a revolutionary movement 
will not find in Mao( ... ) the answers to his problems.12 
According to David Galula, a confluence of mi l itary and non­
mil itary operations defeats the insurgents. This requires an functioning 
organization vested with the power to coordinate political, social, 
economic, and military elements. For Galula, counterinsurgency efforts 
require un ified command, a single source of direction. This means a 
'tight' organization is needed : 'A single boss must direct the operation 
from the beginning to the end .' 13 The mi l itary, moreover, cannot be 
al lowed a free hand in the overal l  direction of the war. 
However developed the civil administration may be in peacetime, it 
is never up to the personnel requirements of a counterinsurgency. ( ... ) 
The soldier must then be prepared to became a propagandist, a social 
worker, a civil engineer, a schoolmaster ( ... ) But only for as long as he 
cannot be replaced, for it is better to entrust civilian tasks to civilians.14 
That m eans that, according to Galu la, 'Essential though it is, the 
mi l itary action is secondary to the political one, its primary purpose 
being to afford the political power enough freedom to work safely 
with the population .  Th is, i ncidenta l ly, is what the Chinese 
Communists have always tended to do.'15 
When a large element of the population in a country feels 
insecure, this normal ly affects developments and especia l ly the 
initiative in the warfare :  the initiative is gained by the insurgents. An 
important d i lemma that the Western states wil l probably always face 
is the pol itical desire to secure the various forms of freedom for the 
majority of people, at the same time as having to fight the actual 
insurgents who threaten the inner stabil ity of society. Here, historical 
12 David Galula. Counterinsurgency Warfare. Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 1 964), 
see his " Introduction", p. xi. 
13 Ibid., p. 87. 
14 Ibid., p. 88. 
15 Ibid., p. 89. 
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examples may be useful as it is possible to demonstrate certain 
recurring patterns from the many wars since 1945. A number of 
mi l itary and political measures do not appear to have worked as 
hoped - they should probably be avoided. It is, however, always an 
assumption that those who make use of this type of historical lesson 
have the self-insight not to try to directly copy something that may 
have been successful in an earlier war without always taking the 
necessary account of local real ities. As previously indicated, no two 
wars are the same in practice, and they are always coloured by local 
political ,  social, economic and other topical factors. 
The war against the regime in Iraq in the spring of 2003 with the 
subsequent 'continuation war' that was sti l l  going on when this book 
was written wil l be used as an example here. 
Baghdad fel l ,  after only token resistance, on 9 April 2003. The 
Sunnis in particular felt that the army had betrayed them and many 
felt humi l iated. Almost overnight, the world, as they knew it, had 
been turned upside down; Despite this, it would be almost a year 
before resistance to the American occupation would result in a more 
organised openly armed insurgency.16 However, even as early as in 
the summer of 2003, the American coalition had seen a number of 
terrorist attacks directed at the coalition forces. In retrospect, one 
can obviously ask oneself whether the sti l l  ongoing insurgency would 
have broken out if the Americans has prioritised at an early stage a 
free election, had not immediately disbanded the Iraqi mi l itary forces 
and had prioritised the rapid restoration of water and e lectricity 
supplies during this first year. 
As regards the resolution of conflicts, there are often four 
important matters that determine the long-term outcome: 
1 .  The nature of the victory (i.e. the extent, type and whether it 
was a so-cal led 'total victory� and possibly other simi lar factors 
count); 
2. The character of the winner. (How does the winner communicate 
with the losers? How do they behave and what is their attitude 
towards the losers? The abi l ity to take action in the local 
18 In April 2004, battles broke out between American forces and the Shi'ite Muslim Mahdi 
militia. Al almost the same lime, forces from the U.S. Marines carried out an abortive operation 
to take control over the Sunni Muslim city of Falluja. 
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community to look after security in general, being respected as 
'hard but fair', etc.); 
3. The nature of the defeat (loss of core military capacities, no 
possibility of continuing the war, etc.) ; 
4 .  The character of the losing side (did they real ly lose [in their 
own eyes]? Do they see themselves as losers? Do they accept a 
defeat and get on with things - or.do they strongly want 
revenge?) . 
Although some insurgent groups began the 'continuation war' in 
Iraq in the summer of 2003, this is by no means an unique war. 
There have been more than 80 different kinds of (major) wars since 
1945 and the majority of these have been of the nature of guerri l la 
wars. For the same reason, for those who would l ike to study how 
these earlier wars were conducted, there is extensive l iterature. The 
quality obviously varies, but there is always something to be learned 
by studying earlier conflicts. Some examples of what is often discussed 
in l iterature with regard to insurgency and counter-insurgency are: 
1 .  What use are routine patrols? Adherents often emphasise that 
there are many areas where patrolling is effective, particularly 
as a 'confidence building measure' and also in connection with 
the intel l igence gathering. But the picture is not so entirely 
positive if we study a great number of conflicts. We have often 
seen that the soldiers are a lmost 'going on a trip' and they are 
given no clear mission that forms part of any executive strategy 
for the warfare. Although it has been stated that this is a way in 
which to demonstrate one's presence ('showing the flag'), the 
impact of patrols like this have been debated . If this is to function 
as intended, it is necessary to operate according to a clearly 
formulated mission and for activities to be effectively led and 
controlled by the local military leadership. 
2. 'Clean-up operations' and similar activities carried out on a large 
scale, what the Americans in Vietnam called large-scale sweeps, 
have seldom led to lasting progress for the security forces. It is 
obvious that one should attack the insurgents when things look 
promising, but normally this type of raid only leads to a few of 
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the adversary's soldiers being taken out. Experience points 
instead to more cost-effectively capturing base areas - and then 
'permanently' controll ing this area . The adversary cannot then 
come back in a week or two and use the area again as if nothing 
had happened. The French and, later, the Americans a lso used 
great resources on this type of operation di rected at the 
opponent's units and they often managed to temporarily capture 
their base areas but got little reward for their efforts. 
3. Isolated outposts in many smal l  garrisons just sitting and waiting 
for the insurgents to 'come back and get them' have a very 
disruptive effect on soldier morale and are normally tactica lly 
unwise. If an outpost is to work, it must be used in connection 
with the safeguarding of communication l ines and it must be 
easy to reinforce the outpost if there is a threat of attack. Here, 
it is also important what forces are used to man the posts. If 
they are manned by locally recruited forces, this affects the 
situation. If the insurgents are provoked to use their resources 
to fight their own countrymen, the war wil l  take on a different 
character than if the insurgents are fighting against a foreign 
occupying force. 
4. Nor should any of the activities mentioned be used to establish 
so-called 'front l ines' - the traditional type of front line actually 
does not exist in this form of warfare. On the other hand, the 
active use of posts a few times can provide a positive result, as 
this may contribute to denying the insurgents the opportunity 
of using certain areas and routes for an advance. In so doing, 
they can be channelled through the areas that the government 
forces want them to use, where, for example, the Special Forces 
or wel l  trained police are active. 
If a threatened regime is, possibly with support from the West, 
to have hope of winning against a wel l -organised insurgent 
movement, it must be equal ly wel l  organised and have the political 
will to keep going for a long time. Without such a wil l, it is l ikely that 
the ruling regime (or more tangibly: the regimes that have now been 
established in both Afghanistan and Iraq), will u ltimately fa l l .17 
1 7  With reference to Martin van Creveld; if  one is to win against a low technology adversary 
who fights on other terms, one must, according to the same author, organise oneself in 
accordance with this, and fight on the same terms. See van Creveld, The Transformation of 
War(New York: The Free Press, 1 991 ). 
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The political leadership should always desistfrom wishful thinking 
- but history has many 'bad cases' about this tendency. At the 
beginning of a conflict it is therefore vital that both the top political 
and mi l itary leaders work out what type of warfare they wi l l  face, 
and should notdecide to bel ieve that they wil l  encounter any other 
type of warfare than that most l ikely. Another unfortunate tendency 
has been to try to assert that the insurgency wil l soon be overcome, 
i.e., trying to turn the conflict into something that it is not: a 
confrontation over control of a country or, at the very least, a contested 
area . This is the most important strategic task that the political and 
m i l itary leadersh ip shou ld  be faced with, and a lso the most 
demanding .18 This point obviously applies with regard to the waging 
of al l  forms of war, but, as the United States and a few other states 
have normal ly preferred to wage conventional war, they will probably 
also continue to try to do so in the time to come. Another unfortunate 
trend is that they will attempt, as far as possible, to 'force' the enemy 
into their own preferred form of war, instead of accepting that the 
enemy has probably never intended taking them on with conventional 
forces. 
2. Insurgent warfare is common 
Different forms of insurgent warfare have been more common 
in the history of warfare than warfare between nations/nation states, 
i .e., conventional warfare where government-financed armies fight 
battles with each other on the battlefield .  
Another interesting feature is  that, at  least in the European form 
of warfare, those who took to arms against the machinery of power 
were seen as bandits or criminal gangs, right up until the Second 
World War. We saw a change in attitudes during the course of the 
Second World War when resistance movements against the German 
occupation became an accepted activity. It is probably a combination 
of the development of modern national ism, and governments 
'" Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret 
(London: David Campbell Publishers ltd. ,  Everyman's Library, 1 993). See the Third book 
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eventually accepting that individual rights and liabil ities existed, that 
made it possible to accept the use of violent means against the 
state. In practice, insurgent groups were not seen as 'genuine' warring 
participants in irregular warfare until after 1945 and gradual ly obtained 
their status in international law. 19 
As previously suggested, a feature of al l  successful guerri l la 
warfare is that an attempt is made to avoid direct and decisive clashes 
with the state's main forces while concentrating on attacking, and 
possibly overcoming, the enemy's outposts, smal ler garrisons and 
logistics systems - often at unexpected places and times. This principle 
has often been called 'asymmetric' in modern l iterature but this 
manner of thinking and fighting is at least as old as i rregular 
operations/guerri l la operations as a form of combat. 
a. Two wars - different results 
Two relatively modern attempts at combating well-organised 
insurgent forces have often been dealt with in literature. These are 
the protracted British war against primari ly Chinese insurgents in 
Malaya, today's Malaysia, in the period from 1948 to 1962 and, before 
that, France's colonial war in Indochina in the period from 1946 to 
1954, then the US's 'continuation war' on the side of South Vietnam 
from about 1958 to 1972. In Malaysia, as previously mentioned, the 
British were successful in adapting to local conditions and the British 
forces also overcame the Communist rural district-based guerri l la 
movement here. 20 Things were not, however, to go as well in Vietnam 
where, first, France and, later, the US were to prove to be less 
successful in their attempts at learning how to emerge victorious 
from a lengthy 'counter-insurgency'.21 
'On Strategy in General', pp. 207-214. 
19What is probably, in many ways, the best overall historical portrayal of irregular warfare is 
Robert 8. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History (London: Macdonald and 
Jane's Publ. Ltd, 1975). The books is later reprinted in one volume. 
20 Anthony Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1948-60 (London: Frederick Mullen 
Ltd., 1975). This book provides a good historical account of the war. 
21 Phillip 8. Davidson, Vietnam at War: The History 1946-1975 (Novato, CA: Presido Press, 
1988). The book provides a study of the about 30-year long period of war in Vietnam. 
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As regards Vietnam, it proved to be impossible to win against 
the highly motivated Communist leadership with its centre in  North 
Vietnam. The regime here accepted, for instance, great losses, 
something that proved difficult for the Americans in the long run. 
But factors other than motivation and an effective political l ine were 
of importance for the outcome. The US Army in particular showed 
itself barely wil l ing to adapt to local conditions during the Vietnam 
War, and to learn how a Communist-led insurgency should be 
combated . It was a lso important for the outcome in Vietnam that 
North Vietnam could act as a safe base area for the war in South 
Vietnam and that they could use eastern parts of Laos and Cambodia 
to get supplies through and soldiers to the battle areas in the south. 
On their part, the Americans chose, during the first years (the 
period from 1958 to about 1968) to see the war as primarily a 
conventionalwar a la the Korean War. From 1968, the war changed 
character by way of North Vietnam itself, in practice, taking over the 
active wag ing of war with its more conventionally arranged main 
forces. From that point on, the South Vietnamese National Front for 
the Liberation of the South Vietnam (NLF) took on a more marginal 
role. As previously indicated, the Communist m ilitary defeat in the 
1968 Tet-offensive should theoretically have been a clear advantage 
for the US and their South Vietnamese al l ies but, by then it was, 
however, too late - American public opinion and the political el ite at 
home had tired of the war, and the international mood had turned 
against the United States. 
British warfare in Malaysia was a lso, as previously demonstrated, 
characterised by different traditions from American warfare.  The 
British Army had a long tradition and experience as a 'colonial police 
force' and the existing organisational culture, and even British 
historical tradition and the mentality it had created, proved better 
able to tackle and translate the experiences gained into a functioning 
programme for counter-insurgency with regard to what, in Great 
Britain, was cal led the 'Malayan Emergency'.22 The long British tradition 
22 Two interesting comparative studies of the wars in Malaya and Vietnam are: Sam C. 
Sarkesian, Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era. Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam 
London: Greenwood Press, 1993); John A. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya 
and Vietnam. Leaming to Eat Soup with a Knife (London: Praeger, 2002). 
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of closely l inking mi l itary operations to the overrid ing political 
objectives was of much importance for the end result here .  As an old 
colonial power, the British had a tradition of using local forces and 
acquainting themselves with local traditions. Another important reason 
was that the Communist insurgents were mostly recruited from the 
Chinese minority, and thus easily isolated from the Malay population. 
As an old colonial power, the British had a tradition of using local 
forces (here mostly ethnic Malayan) and acquainting themselves with 
local traditions. The Americans often have more l imited objectives, 
such as, for example, base rights and letting local authorities govern 
as they please, as long as they do not interfere with the American 
mil itary forces. 
Of what relevance are these wars to developments today? 
Undeniably, the world has, of course, changed greatly since the 1960s. 
Here, one would have to say that many of the fundamental features 
of this form of warfare, in the Third World in particular, have obvious 
features in common with the confl icts we also see today. A more 
active mi l itary undertaking directed at the Third World also requires 
a totally different understanding of other forms of warfare than the 
mi l itary operations the Soviet Union and NATO's conventional forces 
would have conducted if war had broken out in our own region during 
the Cold War. For the same reason, this requires other insights and 
knowledge on the part of both officers and soldiers than was the 
case only 15 years ago. 
3. 'Modern warfare' - differences and similarities between 
the various forms of warfare 
As Carl von Clausewitz indicated in his book, On War, it is 
important to understand what kind of war one is getting involved 
in .23 Even if the so-called nature of a war can be seen as a constant, 
the methods and techniques involved in war wil l  be subject to 
continuous change in order to meet the strategic context in which 
the war is fought and, especial ly, to be able to meet the operational 
23 Carl von Clausewitz, On War. Translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Pare! 
(Princetone, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1 976/1 984). See, for instance, Book One, 
Chapter One, points 23 to 28, pp. 98-1 01 . Clausewitz discuss "On the Nature of War" in 
Book One, Chapter 9. 
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challenges one faces. After the Second World War, the United States 
in particular, and a lso the Soviet Union up until the 1990's were each 
in their own way responsible for the unusual ly rapid development of 
warfare m ethods and technology. In particular, the United State's 
enormous technological advances in the period since 1991 have, 
however, forced enemies of the US (and enemies of the West in 
general)  to seek alternative methods with which to wage war. As 
previously discussed, the concept of asymmetry comes into the picture 
here, through asymmetric methods and measures being developed 
in order to take on a basica lly superior opponent in combat. 
Some of the new adversaries are actual ly a lmost 'perfectly 
asymmetrica l '. What are cal led 'non-state actors' in American 
terminology wil l, in practice, never take the form of a mirror image 
of the nation state model we ourselves often perpetuate as normal .  
These groups are instead asymmetric both when i t  comes to action 
and motivation, i .e., they do not regard what we perpetuate as normal 
and good - on the contrary. What we fear, these groups do not fear 
and, while our control structures are hierarchical, these groups operate 
more as networks without fixed l ines of command .24 While we in the 
West are continually developing so-cal led 'Rules of Engagement' 
(ROE) in order to be able to better control tactical destruction and 
reduce as far as possible so-cal led 'tactical collateral damage', the 
participants in such groups feel that they are entitled to make use of 
any suitable measure in order to be able to achieve their strategic 
objectives. The best organised of these groups have also shown 
themselves to be extremely adaptable to countermeasures and have 
shown themselves able to maintain their motivation when they pursue 
an ideological assumption and, at the same time, they rarely take 
the form of sitting duck targets as they are not normally dependent 
on large infrastructures or permanent institutions in the same manner 
as a state regime normally always is. It is appropriate at this point to 
point out that, if we study the existing spectrum of insurgent groups 
we find in the world today, it is perhaps only al-Qaeda and 'al-Qaeda 
franchises' that match the description above. The majority of insurgent 
24 Thomas Barnett, Asymmetrical Warfare, (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, Inc, 2003), pp. 1 -
24. This book provides a good introduction to the various American assessments with regard 
to modern insurgency. 
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groups that are attached to only one place and who fight among 
their own people are a good deal more traditional with regard to 
how they fight. This also applies, to a great extent, to the 'new' 
Islamic insurgent movements in the Middle East. 
In order to understand such warfare, one must study the broad 
context that forms the basis of the conflict in question : the contest 
between the fundamental concepts of those involved with regard to 
how society should look. There are, however, several ways of doing 
this. The most important point here is that counter-insurgency cannot 
normal ly be easily categorised into clearly distinct levels of confl ict. 
An armed attack enacted at the lowest tactica l level has, time after 
time, shown itself able to have major operational and even strategic 
consequences. It is perhaps the case that each mi l itary patrol that is 
dispatched during certain phases of modern confl icts is planned and 
controlled at an operational level because it is of great importance 
how even each individual soldier behaves and carries out his mission. 
The soldier's actions, no matter how insignificant they may appear 
to be, seen at a tactical level, could be blown out of proportion by 
the media. Something that could objectively be seen as a less 
important event could become 'major news' on the international lV 
networks if it were otherwise a quiet day for news. A minor incident 
could, in the course of a short time, be blown out of all proportion 
and seem an important international matter, even if th is is scarcely 
merited seen in a more objective l ight. 
The media uses whatever material it has available. When a Serb 
mortar shell struck an outdoors restaurant in Tuzla in May 1995, 
ki l l ing 68 young people, this d id not become a "big story" in the 
media . When a similar shell struck a market place in Sarajevo three 
months later, kil l ing 28 people, this received a lot of attention and 
triggered NATO's air war against Serb forces. 25 The difference is 
partly that the international press corps was stationed in Sarajevo 
and was not present in  Tuzla. The a im of this example is  to 
demonstrate that the imperfection of the media can go in both 
25 It is important to note that the attack on the market place was the reason that triggered the 
air war. The actual basis for NATO's involvement had, by this time, been building up over 
several years. The massacre of Muslims in Srebrenica in Bosnia at the beginning of July 
1995 in particular was a decis ive event. 
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directions. It is correct that individual events may be blown up out of 
all proportion by the media.  But it is just as important to note that 
other events are not blown up, simply because the media are not 
present. 
In conventional warfare, it has normally been the case that officers 
have expected that, when the broad political guidelines have been 
put in place, it wil l  be up to the mi l itary chiefs to determine how to 
achieve tactical success. Today, this is not necessarily the case any 
longer and is definitely not the case with regard to counter-insurgency. 
It is easy to see that this could have major consequences for both 
the actual waging of the war, and for the pol itical leaders who stick 
their noses into the tactical waging of the war. Mil itary chiefs obviously 
also retain their traditional roles as advisers to political leaders 
regarding counter-insurgency but it is rare - at least in the West 
today - for military chiefs to have ful l  tactical freedom over mi l itary 
measures that would be seen as internal mi l itary matters in  
conventional warfare. There are certainly many reasons for this, but 
one important reason is the relationship between 'success' and what 
is often the centre of gravity in connection with so-cal led 'counter­
insurgency operations'. The term success wi l l  be defined here on the 
basis of the political objective that it is desired to achieve at the end 
of the cam paign. 
As an insurgency can principal ly be seen as a pol itical struggle, 
it has, since the Second World War, proved necessary, time after 
time, to set a lower target for this form of warfare than the concept 
of 'total victory' represents in a more mil itary context. This does not 
mean that tactical defeat is acceptable, but this signals to the mil itary 
(and other security forces) that there wi l l  be clear  restrictions 
associated with the actual warfare and may also be a signal that the 
goal is quite simply not a clear mi l itary victory as this is not part of 
the politica l goals set for the campaign. It may be the case that the 
intention is to put so much pressure on the insurgents that they wi l l  
negotiate a political solution and give up their hope of a final mil itary/ 
political victory. An important difference between counter-insurgency 
and the situation where two state armies come together in a major 
battle is that, in counter-insurgency, there is almost always a civi l ian 
population to take into consideration. If we look at the restrictions 
that armed forces have imposed on them during counter-insurgency, 
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these are almost always there to prevent an unnecessary loss of 
civil ian lives. It is difficult to find examples where government forces 
have restrictions imposed on them by politicians against ki lling 
insurgents (apart from during periods of peace negotiations) . 
Restrictions on warfare with the intention of sparing the civilian 
population cannot be seen as something negative, either from a 
humane point of view or in a counter-insurgency context. 
In other words, regarding counter-insurgency, the word success 
normally means much the same as having enough military and political 
progress that one can al low the civil ian police to continue to attend 
to internal security in the future. Or perhaps the best one can hope 
for is not to lose the war? 
As an example, one course of military action could be the political 
leaders opting to buy themselves time while attempting to deal with 
the circumstances that have contributed to the insurgency breaking 
out in the first place. This is not necessarily the same thing as being 
forced to make concessions to the insurgents and, in order to avoid 
giving this impression, it may appear counterproductive if the mil itary 
push hard to achieve clear tactical mi l itary victories. El Salvador is a 
good example of a successful counter-insurgency, although with an 
in itial ly hopeless political, social and m ilitary situation for the ruling 
regime.26 It is also very often impossible to say how long the m ilitary 
forces will be involved in the actual confrontation. Counter-insurgency 
is normally a lengthy battle and it is probably always almost impossible 
to say how long a conflict wil l last. It is also almost impossible to 
create one campaign plan where one plans for a quick, decisive victory 
in the style taught at mi litary colleges. As a successful counter­
insurgency wil l probably take years, experiences from most such 
conflicts show that the actual warfare will change greatly over a 
period of time. A tangible sign as to how effective an armed force is, 
is its abil ity to change tactics and combat techniques and the time it 
takes for a change like this to be made. My impression is that American 
forces in Iraq have an open dialogue up and down the chain of 
command, which ensures that it will normally not take more than a 
few days/weeks for tactical adjustments to be made when the soldiers 
have noted that something does not work. 
26 Anthony J. Joes, Guerrilla Warfare. A Historical, Biological, and Bibliographical Sourcebook 
(London: Greenwood Press, 1996). 
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This leads to the mil itary mission having to be correspondingly 
changed in order to satisfy the political ambitions that one must also 
expect to be altered over this period. It is consequently of the greatest 
importance that politicians and military chiefs attempt to identify 
which phase they are in at any time with regard to the ongoing 
insurgency and that they are able to adjust both political assumptions 
and mil itary efforts in order to counter the insurgents' adjustments 
to their own strategic and tactical plans and measures. These 
problems are, seen through American eyes, commented on as follows 
by Steven Metz and Raymond Millen :  
T h e  Un ited States must make clear whether i t s  approach to 
counterinsurgency is a strategy of victory or a strategy of containment, 
tailoring the response and methods to the threat. A strategy of victory 
which seeks a definitive end makes sense when facing a national 
insurgency in which the partner government has some basis of legitimacy 
and popular support. In liberation insurgencies, though, a strategy of 
victory is a very long shot, hence a strategy of containment is the more 
logical one. 27 
A central point that Metz and Mil len make is that, as the insurgents 
will always attempt to avoid becoming involved in so-cal led decisive 
battles at a time that does not suit them, they will, instead, attempt 
to develop operational methods where political and psychological 
factors are given a central place in further warfare - something that 
clearly differs from thinking with regard to ordinary conventional 
warfare. Their recommendation is that the Americans should now 
try to move in the direction of an 'effects-based approach designed 
to fracture, de-legitimize, de-l ink, demoral ize, and de-source 
insurgents'. 28 What the authors are trying to 'sell' here is a new and 
more holistic way of thinking, where one consciously puts together 
several specialist groups, e.g., regional specialists, intelligence people, 
police, officers with operational experience, so that they are able 
overall to perform the complicated evaluations and plans that will be 
required if one is to achieve political and mil itary success in a given 
27 Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, 'Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 2 1 st Century: 
Reconceptualizing Threat and Response', {Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic 
Studies Institute {SSI) Monograph, November 2004), p. vii ,  http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/. 
28 Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, ibid. , p. vii. 
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area. On the part of the Americans this process is underway. 
Depending on who becomes the 'owner of the problem: the American 
Armed Forces as a whole, the Pentagon, the State Department, etc., 
the 'problem owner' will establish a so-called task force in order to 
co-ordinate activities between all those who will participate, put 
together with a view to meeting the needs of the individual case. 
How successful this turns out to be obviously remains to be seen. 
An insurgency normally goes through several stages, particularly 
as a result of the political and mil itary countermeasures that the 
ruling regime and, possibly, its allies implement. Successful insurgent 
movements have al l  demonstrated a great ability to vary their efforts 
over a period of time and have also been able to adapt to the terrain 
in which they operate. Similarly, the mil itary must be able to deal 
with these developments and attend to and adjust the military role 
they play in counter-insurgency. The following three factors are 
normally considered important: 
1 .  It is important to continually analyse one's own fatality figures 
and the results of one's own activity. This will later form the 
basis for tactical adjustments. 
2. A feedback system must be established that captures experiences 
all the way down to 'grass root level' in the military organisation 
and ensures that there is constant dialogue with them. 
3 .  It is  the low-level users who know best what is  not working. 
The mi l itary chiefs must be able to choose adapted mi l itary 
measures over a period of time and must accept that they will never 
gain full control of a heavily guerrilla infested area . Seen in this light, 
perhaps the taking and holding of terrain or towns means less in 
connection with counter-insurgency than it does in connection with 
conventional warfare. Historical experience shows, on the other hand, 
that the supply l ines have been a serious bottleneck for many 
insurgent movements. Food, weapons and the evacuation of the 
wounded are often a main concern for the leader of an insurgency 
and much of the insurgents' resources are used up safeguarding 
supply lines. Seen in this l ight, denying the insurgent movement 
access to large towns, villages, the road network, border areas, etc., 
will be an important element for those fighting an insurgency. But 
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this is a lso a resource-demanding task for the armed forces. This 
has proved to be an important point. It will normally be critical for 
later developments if one can isolate the adversary from his supply 
l ines. This will force him into active measures to break this impasse, 
something that can later be exploited using flexible rapid-reaction 
forces. 
Often, there will be a strategic centre of gravity(CoG) with regard 
to an insurgency: who has clear popular support? Such a centre of 
gravity is actually not possible to attack directly by conventional 
mi l itary means, even if insurgent movements normally use force to 
control the population. An insurgency can be seen as an attempt to 
force political changes and, as a logical result of this, one must try to 
influence ordinary people so that one can influence the actual centre 
of gravity by means of political measures. 
An insurgent movement always needs some form or another of 
'popular coalition', where an attempt is made to gain the sympathy 
of various layers of the population. It will be too narrow to only 
concentrate on the poor, for example. A coalition l ike this will only be 
able to be kept together over a period of time if there is someone 
who keeps it together. In real ity, this means that an enemy image 
must be created. The 'enemy' may, for example, be an undemocratic 
regime or an occupying force - but we also see other ethnic groups 
acting as an enemy in connection with an insurgent movement. If 
the government side is able to break down or entirely remove the 
enemy image created by the insurgent movement, then the insurgent 
movement's days are probably numbered . 
The government side's countermeasures against an insurgency 
should always - at least if we look at this ideally - assume as their 
starting point that the actual core of the threat lies in the insurgent's 
political potential and not in his, initial ly, rather limited mil itary capacity. 
But it is often the insurgents' l imited mi l itary efforts that are 
concentrated on, which can be counterproductive in the longer term. 
The reason for this is easy to see: if one does not safeguard one's 
own population against raids and terrorist attacks, one will encounter 
strong criticism from newspapers and political groups that normally 
see warfare in a short-term perspective. 
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We saw a concrete example of an offensivecounterstrategy from 
the British side in Malaysia in the 1950s. Here, they did not try to 
control the centre of gravity(CoG) by making intensive use of jungle 
patrols or m i l itary offensives but by consciously ta king and 
subsequently making publ ic the political decision that Malaysia would 
be given its political freedom. Mil itary efforts were obviously important 
but were hardly, by themselves, decisive in the insurgency being 
overcome. The mi l itary campaign should obviously put mi l itary 
pressure on the insurgents, but mi l itary efforts are only part of a 
total solution.29 
Mi l itary efforts are planned as only one of several forms of co­
ordinated 'attack' directed at the overriding objectives that the 
insurgents have declared it their desire to achieve. If this is to be 
successful, it is necessary for the actual regime to itself understand 
the danger and be able to develop a suitable 'counterstrategy' where 
both mi l itary and al l  satisfactory forms of political measures are 
included in the plan. If one has been successful in drawing up a 
functioning counterstrategy, one should then next be able, relatively 
easily (at least in theory), to prepare the necessary and adapted 
operational and tactical assessments and concrete plans. While 
mi l itary forces wil l  normally play a central role in certain phases of 
this counteroffensive against the insurgents, their efforts wi l l  
nevertheless only be secondary efforts compared with the necessary 
social and political measures that wil l be required if the regime is to 
survive in the long-term. Here in particular, it has proved historical ly 
difficult to succeed in achieving this balance.30 
Depending on how strong the insurgents are, these mil itary efforts 
will be adapted to developments. A problem that we have seen with 
many modern insurgencies is that the government side's soldiers 
are given this not very glamorous nor particu larly gratifying mission 
to carry out, often characterised by watches, patrols where little 
happens, and routines. They never know when they wil l be shot at, 
as they are not normally on the offensive themselves in th is warfare. 
There may be the rare opportunity for striking offensively and 
29 Sam C. Sarkesian ,  Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era. Lessons from Malaya 
and Vietnam (London: Greenwood Press, 1 993), pp. 55-78. 
30 John A. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Learning to Eat 
Soup with a Knife London: Praeger, 2002), see 'Part I l l, Vietnam', pp. 1 24-1 42. 
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they may then succeed in overcoming a guerri l la group, but it will 
usually be the case that they are preoccupied with stabil isation 
operations and trying to control the insurgents' activities. This is not, 
however, the same as being forced to play a reactive role out of 
necessity. If one can explain to and motivate soldiers and officers 
that this is the reality of this warfare, this will help them to see the 
bigger picture that they themselves are part of, and this will also 
help the mi l itary units involved to understand the role they should 
play. The soldiers must be made to realise that the absence of attacks/ 
hosti lities is success in itself. It is a lso important that, if one is 
successful in getting the military units to understand their role, they 
can also become more effective and will acquire a realistic picture of 
what 'success' is regarding counter-insurgency. 
If one can get the mil itary to accept that the goal will not normally 
be a major victory but, more often than not, smaller local successes 
in the area of the actual counter-insurgency they represent, one will 
have come far. However, we have seen historically that it is often 
difficult for the mil itary to see themselves as only a part of a number 
of primarily civilian measures directed at the insurgent movement. 
Without the military being willing to see themselves as a vital, but 
perhaps not the most important, element on the long road towards 
a political solution, they have often had problems with both direction 
and morale in connection with the protracted wars that the majority 
of insurgent movements prepare for. 
According to the existing (2007) US and NATO military doctrines, 
the military planners may use the terms centre of gravity and decisive 
points (DPs) during planning and execution of mil itary operations. 
As already indicated, insight will be required into the fact that effective 
counter-insurgency will assume one has several so-called 'l ines of 
operation' on the go at the same time, i .e ., military, social, economic 
and legal lines, where one is working towards laying down interim 
goals (so-called decisive points [DP]), where the DP's lead towards 
the CoG. Theoretically all efforts should be co-ordinated so that one 
can keep focusing the entire time on the main targets of the campaign 
which must be the political goals one has set oneself.31 It is the 
31 Lieutenant Colonel Antulio J .  Echevarria II , U.S. Army, 'Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: [It's 
Not What We Thought]', U. S. Naval War College, January 2003. http:/www.freerepublic.com/ 
focus/news/834 1 63/posts 
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military chief's goal to identify these so-called 'decisive military points' 
which one then organises in such a manner that they can be included 
in the chosen l ines of operations with a view to achieving the mil itary 
goals set. The mi l itary planning in connection with the combating of 
a guerri l la could, seen in this l ight, fol low NATO's 'Guidance of 
Operational Planning' (GOP), obviously on the condition that one is 
duly aware that there will be great differences between conventional 
warfare and the combating of guerri l las. There is also a need here 
for the mi litary plan to be devised based on a number of so-cal led 
'operational objectives' which, in turn, will be interpreted and adapted 
at the different levels, something that will make an overall contribution 
to combating the insurgents by marginal ising them. This assumes 
that the mil itary are trained to combat selective targets so that 
unnecessary destruction can be avoided and so that the mil itary 
efforts are involved in supporting the efforts of other state or private 
institutions/organisations. In this form of warfare the DP's could be 
to restore public law and order, control roads/communications or 
clean up in 'prohibited' areas used by guerri l la units. The term 
prohibited areas is used for areas where the government side wants 
to have complete control . The term is also used by some guerri l la 
movements - these are then often called ' l iberated zones: where 
the guerri l la exercises full control .  In order to achieve this level of 
control the forces deployed must have clear plans for resource 
allocation so that they are able to follow up on the plans created .32 
The strategic plans must obviously be led and implemented in 
such a manner that one is in phase with and co-ordinated with al l  
current civilian units and efforts, and aware that one must be prepared 
to adjust the plans made over a period of time so that sight of the 
strategic goal is not lost. The intention m ight be to create a l l  
operational plans in such a way that each overlaps the other (they 
arise as the result of natural phases in the campaign) .33 This is the 
32 NATO's so-called 'Guidelines for Operational Planning' (GOP) may be an example of this 
type of 'operational goal' that is made use of today. This document includes the military 
theory terms that are referred to here briefly. 
33 See Metz and Millen, ' Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 2 1 st Century', pp. vi-viii. 
One should, however, note here that, when establishing DP's, planners often may forget that 
these arise as the result of analysis concerning the identification of critical vulnerabilities. 
This is often not how things are done in practice where DP's are a kind of 'd ivision' of the 
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only way of doing this: it will never be possible to create a great 
'master plan' that will apply to a war that will probably last many 
years. This conceptual  thinking is necessary if one is to take on a 
well-led insurgent movement, but could probably be interpreted as 
being in contrast to the more traditional mil itary thinking with regard 
to what the goals are in connection with warfare. The mil itary chief 
and leaders of such a campaign also has much more complex and 
'undisciplined' task forces from the civil ian community available, and 
has different options to cal l  on than 'pure' mi l itary operations have. 
Here, mi l itary efforts will take the form of a campaign in the broadest 
sense of the term. 
In order to i l lustrate this way of thinking we can assume that, in 
connection with counter-insurgency, a common initiative from the 
threatened regime wil l have succeeded in clearly improving the 
internal security situation in the country, something that can be seen 
as vital progress if we look at the politica l ' l ines of operation' 
established. The military chief sees it as an important new goal to 
exploit the new security situation to regroup with a view to reducing 
the supply of weapons and ammunition that previously flooded in 
from country X - something that can be seen as a mi l itary 'decisive 
point'. This will then be able to be seen as a shift in the so-cal led 
'main effort' (a demonstration of the strength of the factored inputs) 
since fresh tactical progress after the armed forces along the border 
with country X have been strongly reinforced wil l ,  in the long-term, 
contribute to there being fewer guerri l las and terrorist attacks inside 
the country. Such developments will, in turn, possibly lead to being 
able to adjust the political tactics which will again be able to contribute 
to a better relationship with the local community whicb was previously 
kindly disposed towards the guerri l la. (We can possibly see this 
political feature as a political 'decisive point', DP.) 
An historical example of this type of use of mi litary power is the 
British use of offensive operations over the border with Indonesia 
when the strong nationalist regime in Indonesia wanted to drive the 
CoG into its individual factors, which can subsequently be influenced by military means. The 
result of this misunderstanding is that the actual design of the operation and criteria for 
success may differ from the real military challenges and the fundamental relative strengths 
of the involved opponents. 
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British out of their colonies of Sarawak and Northern Borneo, areas 
that Indonesia felt it was entitled to since the country became 
independent in the 1950s. Here, even decisions on smaller operations 
at a company level were taken at a high level so that these operations 
were well in l ine with the chosen political tempo. Eventually, Indonesia 
chose to abandon its political and mil itary pressure.34 
In contrast to this method, and even if French operations in 
Algeria were carried out on the basis of a comprehensive analysis of 
the mi l itary 'decisive points', these were, in reality, never sufficiently 
wel l harmon ised with the overrid ing  po l i tica l strategy and 
consequently they was never able to attack the actual centre of 
gravity.35 
a. Assumptions one should have some knowledge of 
Developments in the ongoing wars in countries like Afghanistan 
and Iraq, all play a part in i l lustrating the central problem with regard 
to modern warfare :  the wars are unconventional/i rregular, are 
guerri l la-led and the use of acts of terror is routine. Another common 
feature is that the insurgents are mainly fighting against what they 
see as foreign occupying forces. This has historical ly often had a 
unifying impact on different insurgent factions and has given them a 
certain legitimacy among the population. 
An important factor to take into account when attempting to 
interpret and understand ongoing wars in the Third World is that the 
modern Western form of conventionalwarfare took in many ways its 
present form during the Second World War. The three ingredients 
that have later dominated this form of warfare have been based on 
the fol lowing key conditions: 
1 .  Ground warfare where the use of armoured combat vehicles 
and self-propelled artil lery have dominated the picture, normally 
including air support. 
34 For a general discussion on nationalism and political developments in Indonesia, see 
Robert Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History, pp. 81 7-824. 
35 Rekkedal, Nils Marius and Zetterling, Niklas, Grundbok i operationskonst - Utvecklingen 
av operationskonsten och dess tearier [Textbook about Operational Art] (Stockholm: 
f()rsvarshelgskolan, 2004), pp. 245-264. 
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2. Naval warfare where aircraft carrier groups and submarines are 
the dominating platforms at sea . It is assumed that these 
seagoing platforms have air support. 
3. In air warfare, the combination of fighter escorts, fighter bombers 
and bombers has dominated the picture. 
These combinations are, in turn, associated with various 
communications systems and supported by sensors. Together, these 
combinations have been at the heart of modern mil itary thinking 
until the present day. It should be noted here that it has not been 
the weapon systems in themselves that have defined warfare but, 
rather, a fundamental assumption or concept that technology was 
decisive for the outcome of a war. The armed forces of all great 
powers in the 20th Century have also been organised with a view to 
themselves being able to exploit the mass investment in technology 
in the most effective possible manner. The mi l itary structures 
developed were obviously designed to be able to take care of the 
material one had obtained, but it was equally important that the 
structures developed were there to ensure the best possible use of 
the equipment on the battlefield. The swift introduction of the nuclear 
weapon in the 1950s would fundamentally change the way the two 
superpowers thought about organising their mi l itary powers. The 
armed forces remained technically focused on a military organisation 
built up around the technology they had based themselves on .36 
Seen in this light, preparing for two different forms of war is perhaps 
nothing new. During the Cold War, the states involved were, at least 
theoretical ly, prepared to be able to both conduct a conventional 
war and warfare where the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) was involved . In our time, it is conventional war and fighting 
against insurgent movements and terrorist groups that dominate -
but, in practice, the conducting of conventional warfare is what most 
Western states prepare for. 
In many ways, we can see a modern armoured division or 
mechanised division or an aircraft carrier group, a fighter or bomber 
unit as symbols of the 'optimal organisation' in order to be able to 
36 See George Friedman, 'Military Doctrine, Guerrilla Warfare and Counter-Insurgency', The 
Stratfor Weekly, 1 3  August 2003. 
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take on and combat similar technology-based forces that other 
industrial countries have built up. These forces are a lso today the 
actual basic structure regarding modern conventional warfare - and 
this structure has also functioned excel lently up unti l now in  th is 
form of warfare, principally targeted against other industrialised 
states. 
It has, however, proved to be the case that when the forces of 
industrial states are deployed against organised guerri l la forces, they 
have only proved to be effective to a l imited extent. Both the US in 
Vietnam and, later, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s 
discovered that the contingency they had available had l imited success 
against guerri l la  forces, even a lthough they normal ly won the 
individual battles they took part in. A fundamental problem has been 
that, since the 'base units' in most guerri l la movements are individuals, 
teams or quantities of troops, this is not normally much to deploy 
superior technology against. It is rarely that a sufficient concentration 
of insurgents can be found to be able to fu lly exploit one's own 
superiority in firepower. As previously mentioned, there are some 
exceptions, such as the recapturing of the airport at Saigon and the 
Citadel in Hue during the Tet Offensive ( 1968) during the Vietnam 
War, and Komsomolskaya (in Chechnya) in March 2000. 
A guerri l la force will not normally 'fight clean'. For periods, the 
guerri l la soldiers' weapons may even be buried or at least carried 
concealed .  When they gather to carry out a raid or a local attack, 
they produce the weapons they have and combine these with mortars, 
hand grenades or light anti-tank weapons such as the Russian-made 
RPG. When the guerri l la solider appears without weapons, it is, in 
practice, difficult to distinguish him from ordinary civil ians. On their 
part, the insurgents in Chechnya in Russia have claimed that they 
lose more soldiers in the winter when the men trek down to the 
villages as 'civil ians' or try to reach another country, than during the 
hostil ities in the summer. It is not just a case of burying the weapons 
and strol l ing down from the mountains. It is a lso important that it is 
normally the guerri l la forces that have the initiative - it is they who 
choose the time and place of a raid or ambush, not the opponent. 
This itself contributes to reducing the risk of being discovered or, for 
example, bugged in such a way that their orders are known, 
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something that would make it easier for the government forces to 
go on the offensive themselves. Safety in the field is important in an 
insurgent movement. In both the FMLN (in El Salvador) and with the 
Chechens, the individual soldiers often did not know the target of an 
operation until a short time before the operation. 
A guerrilla war that is well led is, in practice, particularly during 
the early phase difficult to combat with conventional military forces. 
The traditional manner of mustering firepower in connection with 
conventional operations is actually not very suitable for combating 
smaller dispersed guerri l la forces, and one does not normally have 
reliable, detailed intel ligence about the insurgents during this phase 
of the war. And even if one does not mind one's own forces destroying 
civil ian property and accepts that there will be civil ian losses, it has 
shown itself to be the case in many of the wars we have seen since 
1945 that the actual mass exodus of civi l ians and punitive expeditions 
against areas where there is much popular support for the insurgency 
are not in themselves any guarantee of success for the ru ling regime 
and the government forces. Deportations and punitive measures are 
not enough to eliminate an established guerrilla movement, as those 
who survive will normal ly resume their activities as long as weapons 
are available and they maintain their motivation.37 
For the same reason, we have also seen that, in order to deal 
with an insurgent movement in a more effective manner, it has often 
been necessary to organise one's own so-called 'counter-insurgency 
troops'. Such thinking is. based on another school of thought within 
modern mil itary thinking, in which the study of guerri l la forces and 
terrorist organisations are central .  Without 'alternative thinking' such 
as this, and access to good, current intelligence, it is difficult to be 
able to combat the guerrilla movement. If the government forces 
are to be successful, possibly together with conventional forces from 
an external al ly, this requires these forces to be trained and deployed/ 
organised in such a way that they can deal with local chal lenges. It 
is often a mixture of Special Forces, locally recruited forces and police 
forces that will, together with a good supply of local knowledge about 
37 Robert M. Cassidy, U.S. Army, 'Why Great Powers Fight Small Wars Badly', Military Review, 
(September-October 2002). Cf., the US's 'strategic villages' during the Vietnam War and the 
British internment of IRA members in Northern I reland in the 1 970s, both of which provided 
limited results. 
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attitudes, culture, religion and social conditions, provide the overall 
'mix of forces' that will be required in order to be able to penetrate 
'safe areas' for the insurgents. On the basis of these resources, one 
should be able to combat the insurgent forces over a period of time. 
Normally such 'counter-guerri lla forces' deal with and perform a great 
number of functions such as: 
1. They must be able to deal with the guerrilla forces in a 'symmetric' 
manner, i .e., be strong enough to be able to go to battle and win 
(at least survive) if the guerri l la leadership decides to muster 
huge forces and attempt to overcome the government forces' 
outposts and smaller garrisons. This is where the availabil ity of 
armoured units and air support comes in as an important mi litary 
factor, part icular ly i n  connection with m i l ita ry attacks/ 
counteroffensives. 
2. It is very important that they are able to recruit and train local 
forces with a view to being able to take on and overcome guerrilla 
forces operating in the area . The local knowledge that this type 
of locally recruited force represents is also of importance for 
obtaining information and intelligence. 
3 .  It is  important in connection with all kinds of counter-insurgency 
that a good intell igence service can be established. It must have 
access to information about how the guerrilla recruits, who are 
recruited, how and where they train, who acquires weapons and 
ammunition along the way and how propaganda and the 
indoctrination of guerri l la soldiers and of their civi l ian networks 
are carried out. If one is to be able to attack and combat guerrilla 
units, access to information on where they are, where they are 
going, and what plans they might have is necessary. It is also 
important to try to prevent the guerri l la from establishing his 
own 'safe areas', whether in the jungle, in mountain areas or in 
villages/urban areas. All areas should be just as accessible for 
both one's own and the adversary's forces. It is a lso important 
that the insurgents do not have a monopoly on moving or 
attacking at night. 
If the counter-insurgents are to have lasting success, they must 
try to split up the insurgents and the civi lian population . If one uses 
Mao Zedongs old saying 'the fish in the water� the counter-insurgents 
must be able to catch the 'fish' (the insurgents) in the 'water' (the 
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people) . If they are unsuccessful in creating a split between the 
insurgents and their civil ian networks, the guerrilla is l ikely to survive 
and simply grow stronger over a period of time. The idea of splitting 
the insurgents from the population sounds easy. In reality, it is then 
necessary for the government forces and their local al l ies to control 
the country villages and towns, something that is demanding. It is 
not enough for the government forces to be there during the day if 
it is the insurgents who dominate at night. As it is often the insurgents 
who have organised the population first, it will be a difficult and time 
consuming task to create a network of informers when the insurgents' 
network is already in place and to make a note of a l l  people who 
speak with the government soldiers. 
This wil l be particularly difficult if one is involved in an ethnic 
conflict and one's local allies are not from the same ethnic group as 
the dominant section of the population. In Iraq today, for example, 
it cannot be taken for granted that the local Sunni Arab population 
wil l have anything to do with government soldiers who often are 
made up  of Kurds and Shias. 
It is obviously normally a distinct advantage for an insurgent 
movement to have a local population to rely on, but the supply 
element does not always have to rely on the local population . From 
a supply point of view, we can, in connection with many modern 
conflicts, steal a little of Mao's old saying and state that the 'fish' 
does not actually need 'water'. In several guerri l la wars, we have 
seen the local population actually become a burden for the insurgent 
movement. This is particularly the case if the government forces' 
tactics for counter-insurgency are based on terrorising the population 
and the insurgents are, at the same time, very much pre-occupied 
with protecting the population that they themselves come from. This 
problem is most frequently seen in connection with ethnic conflicts 
where the population belongs to other ethnic groups than the 
government forces. Then the 'fish' must carry the 'water', something 
that again makes the guerrilla very vulnerable to attacks from the 
counter-insurgents. This happened in El Salvador at the beginning 
of the 1980s 38 and, more recently, in Kosovo in 1999. 
38 Anthony J. Joes, Guerrilla Warfare, A Historical, Biographical, and Bibliographical 
Sourcebook (London: Greenwood Press, 1 996), pp. 1 4 1 - 145. 
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The units that often carry out counter-insurgency missions often 
consist of two main components among their forces: 
1. Maybe the most important mil itary force is wel l-tra ined Special 
Forces, i .e., wel l-motivated l ight infantry forces that use heavy 
fi repower/ a i r  support th rough  access to t h e  ex ist i ng  
communications networks. These forces have several tasks, 
including intell igence, raids against the guerri l la, monitoring of 
enemy activity and, in particular, trying to establish good contact 
with the local population and acting as instructors for locally 
recruited sold iers, etc. Special forces will often, on the other 
hand, try to avoid contact with the civi l ian population for security 
reasons. The chose of tactics depends on the actual mission. 
2. In addition, conventional forces are always included, either under 
the control of the main units of the Special Forces that are 
involved, or more common, under their own command.  These 
forces represent various forms of heavy firepower support and 
such forces wil l  constitute the main force if they have to overcome 
large bands of guerri llas. 
For example, during the introductory phases in the Vietnam War 
(before 1965) specialised 'counter-insurgency' units were normally 
those who carried out the two kinds of task described above. Special 
Operation Forces (SOF) or 'Green Berets' were often the names given 
to the American Specia l  Forces that had begun to arrive in  South 
Vietnam as early as 1962 as instructors and advisers for the 
conventionally trained South Vietnamese government forces. 
This way of doing things had, however, at least two fundamental 
weaknesses when we look retrospectively at the strategic rational 
behind this: 
1. Most importantly, the supply of specia l ly trained counter­
insurgents during the Vietnam War was never sufficient to be 
able to base the warfare on their methods and style of warfare -
and the number of these Special Forces was probably never 
enough later either. 
2 .  It should be noted here that i t  is  not how many guerri l la soldiers 
the enemy has that is decisive, but how large the actual civi l ian 
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population is in a confl ict area. The government will normally 
need a rather big security force to police the people living in an 
insurgent area . 
It is probably relatively uninteresting where the civilian population 
stands politically during the first phase of the conflict. The pol itical 
situation changes all the time and political moods may change several 
times on the way to the final goal . What counts is whether those 
who are to combat the insurgency have enough suitable forces to be 
able to 'penetrate the sea of people' down to the guerrilla . Why is 
this important assumption? There are almost always 'openings' in 
the security network that the counter-insurgents may try to find and 
this may need a significantly larger number of forces on the regime's 
side than the often l imited number of insurgent soldiers that exist if 
one is to hope to establish an acceptable and credible local and/or 
regional security situation .  
The guerri l la always operates in an environment where, almost 
regardless of what the security forces do, there will be enough targets 
to attack and not even the best-trained forces loyal to the government 
could prevent civilians and groups loyal to the government (particularly 
leaders) being attacked under normal circumstances. We see this 
clearly today in Iraq where never a day goes by without a significant 
number of attacks against the new regime and those who support it, 
and against American forces and civilian employees who work for 
foreign companies in Iraq. In addition, large forces are required in 
order to deal with the passive security that is expected - particularly 
by the civilian population. (It is estimated that [in the summer of 
2005] about 22,000 security personnel were working in Iraq as private 
contractors and this is actually greater than the entire British military 
contribution.)39 Another term that can be used to describe the situation 
is 'preventative security'. 
These operations often appear to the government side's soldiers 
as a rather boring and hardly motivating service, but extremely 
essential work. An important task for the armed element of the 
government is to defend or protect the civi l ian population, the 
39 For a very thorough discussion of this phenomenon. see Singer, Corporate Warriors, pp. 
230-242. 
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machinery of government and/or economic targets so that they can 
live an almost normal l ife without the ideals that the government 
professes to being undermined. 40 Seen in this l ight, security forces 
are what one must have most of - it then becomes the task of the 
el ite forces to actively pursue and overcome the mi l itary and political 
cadres as well as the guerril la's core troops But an operational pattern 
such as this is itself a problem. The elite forces are often those that 
are noticed for their efforts. As previously demonstrated the ordinary 
infantry units and police who experience an often dangerous day-to­
day existence, which is hardly inspiring, out in the rural areas or in 
the towns, may feel that they are given l ittle credit for their efforts. 
The large number of soldiers that wil l  normally be required in 
order to begin to combat the guerrilla forces in an effective manner 
can rarely be led and financed by a foreign great power, except 
perhaps with the exception of those occasions when an insurgency 
has broken out in a small country, in terms of population or measured 
in square kilometres. As we are now seeing in Iraq, and previously in 
Vietnam, the logistical costs of major involvement can be significant 
- perhaps large enough that it would be i l l-advised to continue, 
regardless of how the war goes. Put bluntly, this means that, if one 
is to have any hope of defeating a well-led guerri l la movement, one 
should invest everything in developing a locally recruited mil itary 
force (including police forces) that can themselves eventually take 
over responsibility for combating the insurgents, or at least be strong 
enough for the adversary to understand that he can never win .  Unti l 
then, an insurgent movement will normally not be interested in real 
negotiations. The role of the local ly recruited forces will then be to 
operate as main forces/security forces and they will normal ly be 
tra ined as infantry. These forces wil l not only defend important 
infrastructure but a lso operate as support troops when one combats 
large guerri l la units. Another aspect of this is that the locally recruited 
troops know the local culture better than any foreign troops can be 
expected to. Seen in this light, these forces are, if they are trained in 
an acceptable manner, important ambassadors for the regime and 
can deal with the civil ian population in a natural way. Secondly, this 
•0 Robert R. Tomes, 'Relearning Counter Insurgency Warfare', Parameter, Spring 2004. http:/ 
/carlislewww.armv.mil/usawc/Parameters/04spring/tomes.htm 
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will be of great importance as intel ligence can be obtained from the 
area 'the fish [the guerril la] is swimming in' through day-to-day 
contact with civi l ians. This wil l also be key information for the Special 
Forces that are to try to identify and overcome the many large and 
small guerri l la units and the political/rel igious leaders of these. 
However, recruiting from a previously heavily guerri l la infested 
area is a lways associated with problems. Can the people recruited 
be trusted? This has obviously been a major problem for the 
Americans in Iraq in 2004.41 Several freshly recruited Iraqi units simply 
'disintegrated' when they were deployed against the city of Fal luja in 
Iraq. The causal relationship here is created in such a way that it has 
not been easy to determine why the Iraqi units, led by Iraqi officers, 
did not work. But there are probably two particularly significant 
factors. The Iraqi forces had not yet reached a sufficiently high 
standard of training to be able to carry out complicated and intensive 
urban operations and political guidance was given to the local USMC 
commander not to carry out operations under the conditions at that 
time. Gradual ly, as the training of the Iraqi forces has continued, the 
emphasis has been on three things: leadership, individual ski l ls and 
the abil ity to carry out operations at battalion level . As at the late 
autumn of 2005, it was assumed that this basis had been somewhat 
improved .42 
Historical ly, it has proved to be extremely easy for guerril la cadres 
to become enlisted in the new security forces that are set up and 
this has been particularly common in situations where the guerri l la 
war is a lready a real ity and the government forces are desperate to 
try to deal with this by expanding their own forces.43 Under wartime 
conditions, an actual security check on a l l  new recruits is often 
something that is impossible, even with the huge foreign forces 
present in Iraq today. Seen in this light, it can almost be assumed 
•• Waleed Ibrahim, 'Rebels Strike Iraqi Forces After Bin Laden Call', Reuters Report, 28 
December 2004. 
•2 Frank G Hoffman, 'Complex irregular warfare, "FPRl's conference 'The Future of American 
Military Strategy' held at the Union League of Philadelphia, December 5, 2005. This essay 
is a shortened version of his conference paper. (He is a Research Fellow at the Center for 
Emerging Threats and Opportunities (CETO) in Quantico, VA, and is a non-resident Senior 
Fellow of the FPRI.) 
0 Rekkedal (1 980), 'The Destruction of Oppression', see Chapter Three: 'The Building of 
the Underground Organization', pp. 76-94, and Appendix 1 .  
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that, when one recruits for new forces in the middle of a war, one 
will get guerri l la forces in both the police and ground combat forces. 
One of the consequences of this is that it becomes extremely difficult 
to keep one's own offensive operations secret. And, as it is, in practice, 
impossible to distinguish what the actual political opinions of recruits 
or officers are by means of any known technical aids, there is no 
effective manner of avoiding infiltration. This will be particularly bad 
if recruitment has mainly been carried out under the supervision of 
the external 'supporting power'.44 A foreign force has, in practice, 
extremely l imited loca l knowledge about things l ike attitudes, 
traditional loyalty and culture - and, without this kind of insight, it is 
almost impossible to 'weed out' the adversary's infiltrators. 
What is described above shows that, historica lly, it has often 
been the case that the insurgents have had a built-in advantage. 
When they have infiltrated government forces, the insurgents will 
have a good supply of basic information on tactical, operational norms 
and general mi l itary assumptions. In practice, it is almost impossible 
to guard against infiltrators. Something that easily can be done is to 
ensure that information on forthcoming operations is kept back until 
such time as it is impossible for any infiltrators to take this to the 
insurgents. This is a tactic that several insurgent movements a lso 
use. The 'need to know' principle is a good protective mechanism in 
most contexts. If it is assumed that the infiltrators are operating 
individually and do not know each other, it is a lso important that no 
soldier/officer find himself alone in a situation where he could cause 
great damage, for example, while guarding an important object, as 
a communications operator, on admission checks. This information 
will obviously be exploited by the insurgency's political and mi litary 
leaders and they will often have a better intell igence picture than 
the government forces. The guerrilla who can either decide to hide 
in the terrain or 'disappear' into a loyal or at least non-informant 
population, now has a clearly superior operational starting point with 
a good supply of information on future m ilitary operations. The 
insurgents are free to choose whether they themselves will use military 
means or whether to avoid combat against a superior military force. 
In a situation l ike this, it is the guerri l la forces that have acquired the 
44 The Associated Press, ' I raq Infiltration on U.S. Bases Well-Known', 28 December 2004. 
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operational upper hand because they can normally assume that they 
will be able to surprise the enemy tactically. 
It is, of course, always the objective of those attempting to combat 
the insurgency to turn this clearly negative picture around .  Most 
theorists who have written about counter-insurgency have also 
asserted that one should try to mirror the guerri l la's capacity. 45 There 
are, however, grounds for being sceptical about whether this is 
possible at an operational level, particularly when it is a lmost 
impossible for foreign forces to infiltrate a guerri l la movement. It is 
obviously difficult for a white person or a black person to pretend to 
be Asian. There is probably a better chance of succeeding in this at 
a tactical level if local forces are used . This means that, if good 
information is to be obtained on what the insurgents are planning at 
a high level, it can be hoped that they wil l give themselves away 
through communications systems or using electronic means of 
gathering intelligence. The alternative is if the security forces can 
themselves recruit people who are negatively disposed to the 
guerri l la's cause, but who, nevertheless, have access to the guerri l la 
leadership. Practice from modern guerri l la wars has shown that it is 
difficult to succeed in 'planting' an agent in the guerri l la leadership, 
while it has often been very easy for the insurgents to obtain access 
to information from the adversary's operational level .  During the 
Vietnam War, for example, operations were disclosed on several 
occasions as the result of poor communications security - on both 
sides.46 
Historical ly, attempts have often been made to deal with this 
handicap by using the often less correct intell igence held, and 
compensating for this by planning and carrying out major mi l itary 
operations. Then if the planners did not, for example, know exactly 
where the guerri l la was located or were not sure of who actual ly 
were active members, they undertook large so-ca l led mobile 
•5 Some of those who have themselves both practical experience of, and have written about, 
counter-insurgency are the Englishman Sir Robert Thompson, the Frenchmen Roger Trinquier 
and David Galula and the Americans John S. Pustay, Jeffrey Race and Douglas S.  Blaufarb. 
Please refer to the bibliography for the actual books. 
48 James Bamford, Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency 
from the Cold War Through the Dawn of a New Century (New York: Doubleday, 2002). p .  
306. 
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operationswhere they went in and occupied a given area in an attempt 
to engage, identify and finally overcome the guerri l la units located in 
the selected area . Both the French in Indochina and, later, the 
Americans in Vietnam made extensive use of this type of 'heavy raid' 
with largely l imited mil itary success.47 Several mil itary or civil ian 
researchers who have written about this type of operations, have 
demonstrated that th is type of warfare had at least th ree 
consequences: 
1 .  They were normally large and not very cost-effective operations 
where reinforced battal ions were, in practice, often used to 
overcome a group of 10-15 men . In such a situation it is difficult 
to see that the efforts are in proportion to the result, and it 
becomes extremely difficult to see if a minimal 'tactical success' 
such as this wil l have any positive strategic effect at al l ,  since a 
large guerri l la unit normally split up into smaller groups and 
usual ly decided to flee and not 'fight to the last man'. The guerri l la 
unit could, in  practice, not then be defeated and the rest of the 
units would gather their thoughts and reorganise as soon as the 
enemy's main forces had pul led out. 
2. Another factor was that the operations the mi l itary carried out 
often contributed to heightening pol itica l problems. Large 
operations of the type described above wil l  not normally be carried 
out by specialised units to combat insurgent forces. Special Forces 
are normally trained to be able to carry out very selective mil itary 
operations. 
3. If one indiscriminately carries out what the Americans often called 
'search and destroy missions' in Vietnam, and al lows traditionally 
trained mi l itary forces to carry them out, these will often use 
maximum firepower to keep their own losses down. As such 
operations are often carried out in densely populated areas, one 
wi l l  a lmost always infl ict local losses. The result has often been 
that the local population becomes more hostile towards the 
•7 Gen. Lt. Harold G. Moore, Joseph L. Galloway, We Were Soldiers Once, and Young: la 
Orang: The Battle that Changed the War in Vietnam (Norwalk, CT: The Easton Press, 1 992/ 
1 995). The book describes the Battle of la Orang, a hilly area in South Vietnam, which can 
be described as a 'heavy raid' into an area held by a North Vietnamese division. 
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government forces (or to the foreign troops supporting them) 
and more sympathetically disposed to the guerri l la due to great 
losses and major devastation local ly during battles. When they 
later sent in Special Forces and other forms of mi l itary-civi l ian 
units (including police and civil ian officials) to 'pacify' the now, 
in theory, 'cleansed' area, this was an extremely difficult and 
lengthy job to carry out. The results have often proved to be 
less than successful .  
And this brings us to what is probably the fundamental problem 
when attempting to counter an insurgency that is a lready wel l  
underway. During the opening phase, the guerri l la movement i s  
normal ly a small group of people who have decided to use violent 
methods to change what is to them an unacceptable economic or 
political situation. It will always be a while before the next stage of 
developments is reached, where the guerri l la is able to develop a 
complex organisation with its own logistics and tax system and where 
they possibly obtain weapons and other special support from abroad. 
Anthony James Joes in his book on guerril la warfare stated under 
the heading 'What guerri l las need': 
To survive, guenillas need intelligence (i.e. good information about 
their environment), high morale, and ideally a secure base. To win, 
they need help from outside the country. Good intell igence is of 
primary and decisive importance. Well-led guerrillas assemble rapidly 
in numbers superior to their opponents and then disperse quickly. 
To do this they must have accurate information on the location, 
numbers, equipment, morale, and intentions of the enemy. This 
intel l igence must come from the civil ian population (normally 
peasants and small merchants) of the area in which the guenillas 
operate. 48 
During the first phase, the guerri l la is mainly preoccupied with 
surviving and developing his own political base, i .e., the nature of 
the guerril la war must, by necessity, appear more political than 
mi litary. Historical ly, it has also often proved to be the case that the 
gueni l la movement has become more vulnerable when it reaches its 
second stage and becomes more mi l itarily potent than it was in the 
48 A. J. Joes (1 996), Ibid., p. 5.  
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militarily weak introductory phase. If the government forces are well­
led and have decided on a sensible 'counter-strategy', the army's 
heavy equipment will, however, come into its own - particularly if 
the guerrilla arrogantly attempts to attack and/or hold areas or cities 
before he is at least as well equipped and trained as the conventional 
forces deployed against him. But doing 'big battles' with the regimes 
main forces may not be a serious problem for the guerri lla, as the 
threatened regime's political situation has often greatly deteriorated 
in the meantime - an negotiated solution may come forward before 
the M aoist style 'Third Phase big battles' becomes a reality. 
Even if it is now, at least in theory, possible to inflict great losses 
on the guerri lla, the supply of new recruits is so good within the 
increasingly hosti le local population, that the guerri lla can relatively 
easily compensate for the losses incurred i n  clashes with the 
government forces. In reality, it is often difficult for the regime to 
continue the war as before and it realises that it is not possible to 
win 'purely militarily' against the guerrilla forces. At this stage it  has 
often been seen as necessary to begin negotiations - possibly through 
intermediaries. Sometimes this leads to progress, but perhaps equally 
often we will see a new round of warfare before either the regime 
realises it has lost, or a great power intervenes in the war on the 
side of the government in order to try to tum the war around again. 
The Vi etnam War is a good example of thi s kind of mili tary 
intervention, when the Americans realised that the regime in South 
Vietnam was succumbing to pressure from the NLF and North Vietnam 
in the spring of 1965. 
If a regime loses the politica/battle against the insurgents, there 
are actually one of two alternatives remaining: one could obviously 
give up the struggle, or attempt a war of attrition against the 
insurgents. As, first, the Am ericans and then, later, the Soviet Union 
were to experience, it is, in practice, difficult for even a great power 
to sustain increasing losses over several years in a war, particularly 
in the Third Worl d. There is always a danger here of politicians getting 
fed up or of the build up of popular opinion against participation in 
the war, over a period of time. The question that will always come up 
is whether this war is actually of crucial importance to one's own 
national i nterests. If the answer to this is no, we will probably see a 
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withdrawal from the actual war, even if this means that the regime 
one initial ly entered into the war to support now risks fal l ing. South 
Vietnam is a classic example of this. 
The fact that a great power is supporting and has great influence 
on the government's policies is something that can very much provide 
the insurgent movement with the sympathy and support from sections 
of the population . For example, in the Phil ippines, the promise to 
close down the American bases (and the fal l  of Ferdinand Marcos in 
1986) were important elements in the fight against the Communist 
NPA guerri l la .  Similarly, it took three years for the Afghan Mujaheddin 
to take Kabul once the Russians had first begun to retreat. This was 
despite the fact that most Western observers and journalists assumed 
that the Kabul regime would collapse l ike a house of cards as soon 
as the Russians had left the country.49 As we already know, once the 
Russians were finally out of Afghanistan, the various Mujaheddin 
groups began to fight each other. 
The insurgent movement normally has an astonishing will ingness 
and abil ity to accept the losses that are required if the insurgents are 
well-led and have a strong political will to continue.50 Although it 
cannot be documented, I would state that a well-motivated insurgent 
movement has no problems accepting losses equivalent to its entire 
force over the course of a period of 3-5 years. In practice, we are 
not ta lki ng about the force being 'replaced', but the guerri l la 
organization being able to compensate for losses it  suffers as quickly 
as they are inflicted. There are great problems associated with finding 
rel iable casualty figures in an insurgency. Insurgent movements 
seldom release figures on their own losses. The adversary often issues 
exaggerated reports of the insurgent movement's casualty figures. 
In El Salvador, the capital's (San Salvador) conservative newspapers 
used casua lty figures that (if they were correct) would have meant 
that the FMLN would have had to renew its force every 12-24 months 
- something that is hardly possible for any insurgent force if it is to 
be combat fit. By comparison, the insurgents in Chechnya would, if 
•• Another important reason for the Mujaheddin's lack of progress could be that they could 
not handle the adjustment from defensive guerrilla warfare to offensive warfare. 
50 Th . Hammes, The Sling and the Stone, see his Chapter 6, 'The Vietnamese Modification'. 
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the Russian figures were correct, have had to renew their fighting 
force on at least an annual basis. 
When we talk of casualty figures, the casualty rates (or a l leged 
casualties) between the sides are a topic in themselves. During the 
Vietnam War, the American forces stated that the number of 
insurgents kil led was about 12 times higher than Americans kil led .51 
In Iraq, the relative figures look somewhat similar. In a normal ly 
developing insurgency in the Third World the casualty figures of the 
government forces will - during the guerri l la phase - almost a lways 
exceed the insurgents' casualties. It is not uncommon for the relative 
figures to be 1 :2-1 :4  or higher in the insurgents' favour. In many 
guerri l la wars the claimed casualty figures for the insurgent forces 
will be much higher than the government forces'. When the casualty 
figures also stem from operations initiated by the insurgent forces 
there is every reason to regard the figures with scepticism. During 
the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, reports on casualty figures were 
constantly turning up that the Maoist guerri l la were having casualty 
figures several times higher than those of the government forces. 
For their part, Russian authorities claimed that the Chechens were 
losing about three times as many soldiers as they were. 
Obviously, those com bat ing the insurgency may com e  
unexpectedly upon a base belonging to the insurgents o r  ambush a 
supply column, but these are often exceptions in an insurgency. An 
advantage will also be gained when the forces fighting the insurgency 
are far ahead in terms of technology, training and tactics - as in 
Iraq.52 We see a dilemma here for the ruling regime: if, at an early 
stage, it realises the danger to the regime as a result of the guerri l la 
war that has been initiated, it may nevertheless be difficult to take 
the political strain that will often ensue from implementing widespread 
repression/combating of the guerri l la forces who are sti l l  at an early 
51 William J.  Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, Second Edition (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1 996). In Chapter 1 0, there is an extremely interesting report on 
American and North Vietnamese thinking on casualties and inflicting casualties. There is no 
doubt that the North Vietnamese and NLF casualties were significantly greater than the 
Americans'. 
52 In Iraq, the mentality of the insurgents is also an important element when discussing their 
casualty figures. This is because many of the so-called jihadists can almost be said to have 
what they see as 'martyrdom' as their primary goal. 
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phase and are consequently weak, both politica l ly and mil itari ly. If 
they proceed in too hard a fashion, this could intensify the underlying 
political i l l -feeling towards the ruling regime. If, on the other hand, 
they choose not to intervene with speedy pol itical and mi l itary 
measures, the insurgency will obviously survive and probably slowly 
grow stronger! This is actually a real dilemma that arises in most 
g uerri l l a  wars .  If it  decides to wa it before ta k ing 'tough '  
countermeasures, the regime instead risks meeting an increasingly 
better politically developed adversary who will also eventually increase 
its real military fighting capability. As previously indicated, the guerrilla 
forces could be regarded, at this later stage, more as regular mi l itary 
units. But without receiving significant weapons support from outside 
they will not normally have any hope of taking on and defeating 
large conventional forces. As regards the many insurgencies we have 
seen since the Second World War, we have often seen that the 
government side has managed neither to take an early decision nor 
deal with the reasons for the guerrilla initial ly deciding to begin an 
armed insurgency by way of political, social or economic measures/ 
reforms. 53 This di lemma looks difficult to avoid in parts of the world 
and this is in itself a source of inspiration for constantly new 
insurgencies, particularly in the often less well-governed new nations 
in the Thi rd World .  
If we take developments in Iraq from the summer of 2003 as an 
example, we see here that the US has not been able in any way to 
'surgically' remove what was a rather unorganised and weak terrorist 
campaign directed at American and other foreign forces in  Iraq when 
it began in the summer of 2003 .54 The long series of terrorist attacks 
from the summer of 2005 has assumed a different character. It is 
clear that the warfare can no longer be seen as a temporary terrorist 
53 Joes (1 996), Ibid., see Chapter 7, 'The Sandinista Refinement', p. 82: 'The greatest threat 
to the Sandinistas was the democratic reform movement. If it succeeded while the Sandinistas 
were still getting established in the mountains, the cause of the insurgency would be 
neutralized'. There could be a lot in this - the umbrella that the people gather under is often 
a 'strong man' or an occupying power. In the case of ethnic insurgent movements, the enemy's 
political system is not of decisive importance (but it will be important if it has a look of apartheid 
as in South Africa). 
54 The reason for this may be that the US (perhaps principally Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld 
himself) could be accused of having broken the 'first commandment' of any analysis of warfare: 
what type of war are we fighting? 
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campaign conducted by 'random' Saddam supporters, foreign 'holy 
warriors' and suicide bombers. In Iraq, from late 2004 the al l ied 
forces and the Iraqi regime, was seeing a guerri l la war that was 
beginning to approach 'phase two', as described earlier. ss The attacks 
had became better planned and increasingly directed at the segments 
of Iraq that want the Americans to stay, or that actively work for 
them, including the new Iraqi regime that was establishing itself, 
and not least - against other relig ious and cu ltura l  groups. 
Overcoming this type of guerri l la organisation requires, in practice, a 
protracted war if one is to have any hope whatsoever of succeeding. 
It is a lso becoming increasingly more important that some American 
public opinion already feels that the war has gone on more than long 
enough and that it is already time to withdraw.s6 A desire l ike this -
to be able to get home quickly - is in clear contrast to what we see 
from the historical experiences of similar insurgencies. This type of 
complicated war in Iraq wil l be protracted, particularly now that 
sympathy has been established for the insurgents among the country's 
Sunni M uslims. Additionally, the different insurgent groups have 
changed their strategy and tactics on the basis of new experiences. 
It is, for example, not very likely that they will again attempt to 
defend large population centres l ike the city of Fal luja in late 2004. 
As Iraq now is split into three different 'cultural areas': Sunni, Shia 
and Kurds, and a lso has other minorities, there is much to suggest 
that it will be difficult to find a new political foundation that wi l l  unite 
the nation, even if the Americans and their Western a l l ies pul l  out. 
Violent attacks between the three main ethnic/religious groups have 
become part of day-to-day warfare in Iraq and there is much to 
suggest that the country may be overtaken by a long civil war once 
the US and other al lied soldiers pulls out. The front l ines in any civil 
war will probably consist of Sunni Muslims and Shi'ite Muslim groups 
55 Stratfor, ' I raq : The Implications of a United Insurgency', 6 October 2004. 
56 At a press conference in the summer of 2003, the former Defense Secretary Rumsfeld 
denied that the US had plans to keep its forces in Iraq for more when two years. The two 
years have passed and the Americans do not actually see any chance of a quick withdrawal. 
See, for example, the article written by David S. Cloud and Eric Schmitt, 'U.S. General Sees 
No Ebb in Fight', The New Yori< Times, 24 June 2005. 
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in Baghdad and southern Iraq. In the North, battles will break out 
between Sunni Muslim groups and the Kurdish Peshmerga mi l itia.57 
In the summer of 2005, there were four regions of Iraq that 
were problematic, including the Baghdad area and Mosul, while both 
the Iraqi authorities and the Americans stated that there had been 
fewer attacks in the other regions. The danger of a protracted war is 
clearly present, almost regardless of what the Americans now do, 
including the much better organised counter-insurgency effort under 
the new mi l itary commander, General David Petraeus, who took 
command of U .S. forces in Iraq in the spring 2007. 
Sectarian kil l ings and attacks in Iraq, which were spiral l ing in 
late 2006, dropped during the summer and autumn of 2007. Despite 
the drop in so-called sectarian killings because of the so-cal led 'surge' 
of American soldiers to the main cities during 2007, especial ly to 
Baghdad, there is sti l l  many mil itary and political problems in Iraq in 
late 2007. As a comment to the now a little more positive trends, 
Thomas Friedman wrote an interesting article in New York Times in 
November 2007 about the development in Iraq. Clearly the cultural 
aspects of a country is always important, and as no war will 'last 
forever', we maybe now may see some trends pointing in  a different 
direction, i .e. against sectarian killings and terrorism against religious 
and political opponents: 
To the extent that the surge in Iraq has worked, it's largely because 
those Shiites and Sunnis ready to tolerate some mingling, some 
interaction, have risen up against those Shiites and Sunnis who 
want to just wipe out the other sect and any of their own who don't 
agree. 
There is only one good thing about extremists: They don't know 
when to stop. That was key to the surge. The anti-mingling, pro­
Qaeda Iraqi Sunnis went way too far - in beheading people, suidde­
bombing mosques, forcing marriages with the daughters of Sunni 
57 It is a paradox that the Sunni Muslim insurgents, who, due to their attacks on the two other 
ethnic groups, are increasing ethnic antagonism, would probably be the weakest party in 
such a conflict. Shi'ite Muslims constitute between 60-65 per cent of the population and 
would be very likely to count on assistance from the neighbouring country, Iran, in the event 
of any civil war. Today, the Kurdish Peshmerga militia already constitutes a formidable force 
of an estimated 1 00,000 soldiers, according to The New York Times, 
http://www.nvtimes.com/2005/02/27/ 
international/middleeast/27militia. htmll?ex=1 1 20276800&en=1 c1 3f1 2534e1 ba54&ei=5070. 
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tribal sheiks and demanding that men grow beards and stop drinking 
whiskey. 
It was this extreme fundamentalism that prompted something you 
so rarely see in Arab-Muslim politics: moderate Sunnis going all the 
way, rather than just going away. That is, rising up, risking their 
own lives, even aligning themselves with America, to defend their 
more moderate, traditional, Sunni way of life from the j ihadists. 
And Al Qaeda knows it went too far, which is why, as David Ignatius 
pointed out in The Washington Post, Osama bin Laden, in a little­
noticed Oct. 22 (2007) audiotape, scolded his followers for tactics 
that had alienated Iraqis. "Mistakes have been made during holy 
wars," bin Laden said. 
The same thing has happened among Shiites. Iran seems to have 
dialed down its support for Moktada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army in Iraq -
which has been purging Sunnis and Shiites to prevent any mingling 
- because many ordinary Iraqi Shiites had become fed up with this 
pro-Iranian militia and had begun to blame Tehran ( . . .  ) 58 
The picture described above is rather gloomy, seen through the 
eyes of both the new Iraqi regime and the Americans. But, as in a l l  
wars l ike this, the picture is by no means constant. In Iraq, the 
Sunnis have traditionally been the dominant group, something they 
no longer are since the fal l  of the Saddam regime. One of the most 
important reasons for the insurgency was that the Americans, with 
their then pol itical leader in Iraq, Ambassador Paul  Bremer, decided 
to disband Saddam's army. And it is particularly from these former 
cadres that the insurgents have recruited their people. 
Although there are clearly not just peaceful motives behind this 
turnaround among some of the Sunni leaders, both the American 
and Iraqi official spokesmen have chosen to regard this initiative 
positively, particularly as the same leaders had largely boycotted the 
election of a new parliament in January 2005. In war and politics, 
almost anything is possible - even in Iraq.59 
58 Thomas L. Friedman, 'The Case for Illegal Mingling,' New Yori< Times, November 25, 
2007. 
59 Robert F. Worth, 'Sunni Clerics Urge Followers to Join Iraq Army and Police', Los 
Angeles Times, 2 April 2005. See also the Stratfor analysis 'Iraq: Turning Up the Heat on 
Jihadist Operations', Stratfor, 28 : Turning Up the Heat on Jihadist OperationsMarch 2005. 
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b. The importance of intell igence in counter-insurgency 
As previously demonstrated this type of war can hardly be won 
by the government side without it being able to establish an effective 
supply of relevant intell igence - and, at the same time, being able to 
deny the guerri l la/insurgents forces a similar supply of intell igence 
from its own side. Maybe a regime/government can not win a war 
against an insurgency/guerri l la only because of good intel l igence -
but they will l ikely loos if they do not have good intel l igence. 
It is probably impossible to win without being successful in turning 
around the trend that is now dominant in, for example, Iraq . Here it 
is the guerri l la organisations that now have a good supply of 
intelligence about the government side (mostly based on HUMINT), 
while the government side and the Americans are very dependent 
on technical intelligence. Without succeeding in 'blinding' the guerri l la 
and, at the same time, having a good insight into what the guerri l la 
or terrorist group is planning and doing, it is difficult to achieve mi litary 
and political success in this type of conflict. In connection with this, 
I will briefly describe and comment on developments in Iraq since 
late 2003, developments that wi l l  later be assessed from an  
intel l igence perspective. 
As most Iraqis who have, until now, been part of the various 
guerri lla groups in Iraq have themselves l ittle previous experience 
as guerri l la soldiers, they have had to learn the 'trade' along the way 
and have learned from their experiences and those of others. However, 
some of the officers and former soldier's now taking part from the 
Saddam regime's security and army forces have some experience of 
the regime's previously extremely heavy-handed counter-insurgency 
against Kurds and Shia supporters. 
The core of the insurgency has been based in urban areas and 
the insurgency has so far had a clearly urban character. Larger cities 
l ike Baghdad, Fal luja, Mosul, Al-Sulaymaniyah, Samara and Saddam's 
hometown Tikrit have been one of the most important theatres of 
operations for the insurgents. It is reasonably clear that these 
insurgents enjoy a certain popular support, particularly since it is the 
traditional Sunni-based elite that dominates in these areas. It is also 
important to look at how the insurgency has changed since the first 
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heady days after the US invasion . The quote i l lustrates some of the 
changes over time: 
I used to attack the Americans when that was the jihad. Now 
there is no jihad. Go around and see in Adhamiya [the notorious 
Sunni insurgent area] - al l  the commanders are sitting sipping 
coffee; it's only the young kids that are fighting now, and they 
are not fighting Americans any more, they are just kil l ing Shia.  
There are kids carrying two guns each and they roam the streets 
looking for their prey. They will ki l l  for anything, for a gun, for a 
car and a l l  can be dressed up as jihad. 60 
Before the US started its so-cal led 'surge' of extra soldiers into 
Iraq winter 2007, the situation in Baghdad was grave. This may be 
i l lustrated by the following quote: 
Baghdad has broken up into hostile townships, Sunni and Shia, 
where strangers are treated with suspicion and shot if they cannot 
explain what they are doing. In the mil itant Sunni district of al­
Amariyah in west Baghdad the Shia have been driven out and a 
resurgent Baath party has taken over. One slogan in red paint 
on a wal l  reads: "Saddam Hussein wi l l  l ive for ever, the symbol 
of the Arab nation." Another says: "Death to Muqtada [Muqtada 
al-Sadr, the national ist Shia cleric] and his army of fools." 61 
The situation has later stabilised according to many observers. 
But peace is not at hand - a political solution is sti l l  wanting. 
The l imited rural-based guerri l la activity has mainly gone on in the 
Sunni-dominated areas in Iraq, while the rural districts in the Kurdish 
and Shia Arab areas have largely been quiet. 
The urban guerri l la has also used makeshift bombs based on arti llery 
grenades or aircraft bombs and raids against Iraqi police stations 
and attacks on foreign contractors or Iraqis who have been working 
for the foreign forces or for the temporary Iraqi Government. They 
60 Ghaith Abdul-Ah ad, 'The jihad now is against the Shias, not the Americans', The 
Guardian, Saturday January 1 3, 2007. ('As 20,000 more US troops head for Iraq, Ghaith 
Abdul-Ahad, the only correspondent reporting regularly from behind the country's 
sectarian battle lines, reveals how the Sunni insurgency has changed' . )  
•1 Patrick Cockburn, 'Inside Baghdad: A city paralysed by fear,' Los Angeles Times, I nside 
Baghdad: A city paralysed by fear 25 January 2007. 
JURNAL HUKUM HUMANITER, Vol. 3, No. 4 
Insmgency antt CotK1ler Insmgency Some Concepts and Problems 702 
have probably chosen to invest in  makeshift bombs (so-cal led 
'Improvised Explosive Device', iED) since the shooting skil ls and the 
general soldiering skil ls among the new recruits who have taken part 
in the guerri l la groups so far appear to be rather l imited .62 The 
insurgents have received support from so-called jihadists with training 
and experience from Afghanistan .63 Use of suicide bombings has 
also been part of the picture. Overall, this guerrilla and terrorist activity 
has contributed to making everyday l ife for ordinary Iraqis relatively 
difficult and dangerous in the cities mentioned and a long major 
communication l ines. The guerri l la has, however, succeeded skilfully 
in destabil ising the situation in Iraq and has contributed to it proving 
very difficult to develop a new stable internal Iraqi Government. Since 
the central parts of Iraq are characterised by desert, interspersed 
with fertile and built up areas, this is where the population is densest. 
As there are few suitable large mountain or forest areas that could 
function as 'safe areas' for insurgents in the Arab areas in the southern 
and central parts of the country, the different insurgent groups have 
concentrated on developing and waging war in the urban areas. 
Since the insurgents clearly have had ample access to the dollars 
control led by the previous regime, they have up to now been 
adequately financed . In addition, everything suggests that the 
insurgents do not have any problems either getting money from 
Islamic circles in, for instance, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran, etc. As 
the Americans were clearly barely able to secure or destroy the many 
large stocks of weapons and ammunition during the early phase of 
the occupation, the insurgent groups had an almost unl imited supply 
of such material .64 The Americans and their al l ies simply had too few 
soldiers in the country during this early phase, in relation to the area 
of the country and size of population. Nor were they able to 
demonstrate to the population as such, and especially to potential 
insurgents, that they had control . The wrong signals were a lready 
62 Ann Scott Tyson and John Ward Anderson ,  'Attacks on U.S.  Troops in Iraq Grow in Lethality, 
ComplexityAttacks on U.S.  Troops in Iraq Grow in Lethality, Complexity. Bigger Bombs a 
Key Cause of May's High Death Toll,' Washington Post, June 3, 2007; p. A01 
63 Peter Beaumont and Patrick Graham, 'Rebel war spirals out of control as US intelligence 
loses the plot', The Observer, 2 November 2003. 
64 William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, 'Facts and Questions About Lost Munitions', The 
New York Times, 30 October 2004. 
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being sent at an early stage when American forces largely ignored 
the looting in Baghdad and other cities. Have they, perhaps, now 
also begun to real ise their earlier mistakes in Washington? In an 
interesting interview with one of those who took part at a high level 
in the Pentagon planning, the developments have been clearly thought 
through .  There were clearly disagreements - and, finally, they decided 
on what was hardly the best solution : 
Douglas J .  Feith, a top Pentagon official who was deeply involved in 
planning the Iraq war, said that there were significant missteps in 
the administration's strategy, including the delayed transfer of power 
to a new Iraqi government, and that he did not know whether the 
invading U.S. force was the right size. ( . . .  ) He said mistaken actions 
and policies in Iraq resulted in frequent 'course corrections,' pointing 
to two that he considered significant - both resulting from an early 
failure to put Iraqis in charge. ( . . .  ) 
Even more important, Feith said, was the reluctance among some 
U.S. officials to transfer power early on to an Iraqi government and 
dismantle the U.S. occupation authority, the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA), headed by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer. 'How would 
Iraq have been different if we had terminated the CPA in May or 
June of '03?' and created an Iraqi government, he asked. 'Some 
people said if you do that and it fails, you11 set the country back 
irretrievably and . . .  the only way you could set up a government 
early on would be to rely unduly on the 'externals,' ' he said, referring 
to Iraqi exiles. 'My views were generally in favor of transferring 
responsibility to the Iraqis earlier. I thought there were ways of 
getting the 'internals' involved earlier,' he said, speaking of prospective 
Iraqi leaders inside the country who were not well known to the 
United States before the invasion. 65 
In a compl icated war situation of the type that guerri l la wars 
norma l ly a re, the counter-insurgency forces becomes total ly 
dependent on good intelligence if one is to have any hope of m ilitary 
65 Ann Scott Tyson, 'Official Admits Errors in Iraq. Feith Cites Delay in Transfer of Power, 
Size of U.S. Force', The Washington Post, 1 3  July 2005, p. A 1 2. He also stated in the interview: 
'On troop levels in I raq, Feith said U .S. military commanders - not the Pentagon -
determined the flow of and number of forces into the country. "I don't believe there was a 
single case where the commander asked for forces and didn't get them . . .  the commander 
controlled the forces in the theater", he said. Senior U.S. Army officers dispute this view, 
saying the Pentagon cut off the planned influx of nine division-equivalents into I raq in the 
war's initial phase'. 
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success - something that, in the case of Iraq, is a prerequisite if one 
is to succeed in bringing the situation under control .  In this context, 
it is important to emphasise that mil itary intel l igence in connection 
with counter-insurgency must take a completely different form than 
with regard to conventional warfare. Basical ly, different priorities wi l l  
be required if one is to have success in this type of warfare compared 
with conventional circumstances. Standard procedures such as those 
that are included today in what are called 'intell igence preparations 
of the battlefield' (IPB), 'Order-of-Battle' and 'templating forces' cannot 
just simply fit in here and one is forced to adapt the procedures to 
the situation.66 
Electronic-based intell igence, with its emphasis on measuring 
and establ ishing electronic signals, a lso requ ires a significant 
reorganisation before it can function effectively in connection with 
counter-insurgency. Experiences from Afghanistan and Iraq in 
particular dictate that, at a lower level, i .e., for intell igence officers 
at battal ion (52) and brigade/division levels (G2), one must think 
differently to how one would if this was 'traditional '  so-cal led 
conventional manoeuvre-based warfare. Here, it is oneself that is 
statical ly misplaced in an area and the mission is to try to avoid 
major acts of violence d irected against oneself or the loca l 
administration and population . Naturally, it is also other rules of play 
that apply, and it has clearly proved difficult to change these. Here, 
it is perhaps this pattern of operations that one has tried to follow 
during the many peace support operations that one should try to 
'reinvent' and further develop?67 In this type of lengthy guerri l la 
conflict, 52 and G2 sections will have more than enough to do trying 
to create a local picture of who has power, who actual ly rules a 
housing district, who is related to who, and, obviously, ethnic and 
religious factors in particular must be taken into consideration .  This 
often has more similarities to how normal police workfunctions than 
to traditional field intell igence.68 In an article in Foreign Affairs on 
66 See U.S.  Army, FM 34- 1 30, Chapter 3. 
67 Timothy L. Thomas, 'Preventing Conflict Through Information Technology', Military Review, 
(December 1 998/January-February 1 999), pp. 44-57; Timothy L. Thomas, ' IT Requirements 
for Peacekeeping', Military Review, (Sept-October 2001 ) ,  p .  29. The articles give a good 
overall insight into what American thinking was in this area while they were still heavily involved 
in the Balkans. 
69 LtCol Lester W. Grau, 'Guerrillas, Terrorists, and Intelligence Analysis', Military Review, 
(July-August 2004). 
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developments in Iraq, James Dobbins has taken as his starting point 
his earlier experiences as a special envoy to places such as Bosnia, 
Kosovo, Afghanistan and Somalia . Under the heading 'Picking the 
Right Battle', he describes in the fol lowing way the chal lenges in 
connection with interventions: 
Counterinsurgency campaigns require the close integration of civil 
and military efforts, moreover, with primacy given to political 
objectives over mi l itary goals. They require detailed tactical 
intelligence, which can be developed only by Iraqis and is best 
gathered by a police force in daily contact with the population. 
Training the Iraqi police and building a counterterrorist 'special branch' 
within it should take priority over all other capacity-building programs, 
including the creation of an Iraqi military. 69 
If I am not mistaken, this is exactly the opposite of what the 
Americans are doing in Iraq today. The police forces seem to have a 
lower priority than the Iraqi mi l itary forces. The methods that have 
been shown to provide success in this type of war clearly have many 
similarities to attempts in Western cities today to combat organised 
criminal networks or drugs rings.70 Any success they have had has 
been based on culture and language skills, the development of 
matrices in which it is charted 'who-socialises-with-who� several forms 
of (electronic-based) network analyses (including mobile phone 
tapping), cultural analyses, analyses of money transactions, etc. This 
work should, in turn, result in one obtaining a l ist of, for instance, 
the local people who have been hired in or g iven management 
positions. Are they loyal to those they work for, or have they instead 
been 'planted' by the guerrilla? The latter is, as previously indicated, 
a prerequisite in order for the insurgents' own organisation to be 
able to obtain the intel l igence they need in order to be able to avoid 
being effectively defeated by the conventional forces. 
In the real world, it would be extremely demanding to do what 
has been briefly described above. Much depends on to what extent 
local mi l itary commanders are able to operationalise the gathering 
69 James Dobbins, 'Iraq: Winning the Unwinnable War', Foreign Affairs, January/February 
2005, p. 19 .  
10 Rekkedal and Zetterling, Grundbok i operationskonst. pp. 258-264. (Cf. , also the statement 
from the FBI agent Colleen Rowley, who, following '911 1 '  went out publicly and stated that al­
Qaeda should be fought against in the same way as the Mafia.) 
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and analysis of information that wil l  be requ ired and achieve 
reasonable co-operation with the local police forces. All of this depends 
largely on their own training background . Many of the Marine Corps' 
troops and company commanders in Iraq are, for instance, reservists 
with a background as police officers in American cities. They have 
actively tried to adapt their own police experience to the situation in 
Iraq and there are several good examples of more cautious and non­
violent approaches being more successful, than the use of mi l itary 
resources. This will normally a lso encourage better relations with 
the local population, something that again increases the opportunities 
for better loca l i ntel l igence with a conseq uently i m p roved 
understanding of the situation . In David Galula's description of local 
factors, he has emphasised the importance of the civi l ian police. He 
writes as follows about the role of the local police: 
The eye and the arm of the government in all matters pertaining to 
internal order, the police are obviously a key factor in the early stages of 
an insurgency; they are the first counterinsurgent organization that has 
to be infiltrated and neutralized. Their efficiency depends on their 
numerical strength, the competency of their members, their loyalty toward 
the government, and, last but not least, on the backing they get from 
the other branches of the government - particularly the judicial system. 
If insurgents, though identified and arrested by the police, take advantage 
of the many normal safeguards built into the judicial system and are 
released, the police can do little. Prompt adaptation of the judicial system 
to the extraordinary conditions of the insurgency, an agonizing problem 
at best, is a necessity. 71 
Historically, it has also proved to be the case that it is of l imited 
use to make extensive use of electronic means of gathering  
intelligence when the adversary is  recruiting from peasants who are 
not normally dependent on electronic means of communication. An 
equally serious problem is that many of those who are wil l ing to co­
operate with Western forces often have their own agendas. They are 
often seeking this type of position in order to get the opportunity to 
l ine their own pockets, either through corruption or pure theft from 
government funds or international aid. 
71 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfam, p.  31 . 
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Even if one works hard to achieve this alternative col lection of 
information in comparison with traditional forms of field intel l igence, 
it has often proved difficult to create a sufficiently good intell igence 
picture to be able to attack and possibly defeat the actual insurgent 
groups. It has been possible to destroy certain groups, but there is 
much to suggest that the insurgents' networks are nevertheless 
becoming increasingly stronger in, for example, Iraq. An important 
factor here is that an intelligence officer with a Western background 
wil l need a long time to penetrate the 'local laws' that apply in, for 
example, a Sunni Muslim environment sti l l  heavily dominated by tribes 
and clan thinking. And when the person in question has begun to 
understand some of what is going on around him, his period of service 
in the war zone will often be over and he will be sent home. 
Another point is that, in a war-ravaged country like Afghanistan, 
it becomes a lmost hopeless to try to draw up traditional 'Order-of­
Battle' outl ines with the associated organisational outl ines that are 
absolutely central aids to traditional field intel l igence developed for 
conventional warfare. Drawing up this type of overview will normal ly 
be more or less a 'work of poetry', and this type of information has 
often proved to be of l ittle tangible value in the actual combating of 
the insurgency. What we are talking about here is the mapping of 
networks, which is in itself a far more demanding task than structuring 
hierarchical models. The analogy with ordinary police work is probably 
useful again .  If organised gangs or well-organised criminal groups 
are to be exposed and combated, a special approach to the problems 
is required. As this does not involve 'ordinary' (often unorganised) 
criminals, one must even think differently if one's side is to make 
progress. Normal ly, in connection with the combating of wel l­
organised criminals, the police aim to find out who is involved in 
which gang/group, which part of the city/district the individual gang 
controls, what weapons they have, what tactics they prefer to use 
and how they normally conduct themselves. Simi lar techniques can 
be employed to 'separate the insurgents from ordinary citizens' if 
one paraphrases Chairman Mao's old notion of 'fish and water'. It 
must a lso be clarified what information is actually needed and what 
information is unnecessary with regard to counter-insurgency. The 
standard of intelligence reports is then tai lored so that it is ensured 
that real ly important information reaches the different types of user. 
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Cultural  attitudes obviously have a significant influence on 
attitudes and the operational pattern one chooses to employ. 
Consequently, in practice, there is little chance of being successful 
without intell igence personnel involved in counter-insurgency either 
having good language and cultural skills themselves or at least access 
to loyal people with these skil ls. An insight into the local culture and 
history is almost a prerequisite for real success in this type of war. 
Ideal ly, in al l  battalions and brigades, one should have a good supply 
of this type of expertise with local knowledge and, if possible, also at 
a lower level . But we have often seen in earlier similar operations 
that, as this type of expertise is often a commodity in short supply, it 
has been concentrated at a high level (often at corps headquarters 
or higher) . Access to this type of expertise is obviously not enough 
to win when combating an insurgency where foreign troops are heavily 
involved but, in practice, it becomes almost impossible to achieve 
success without this form of expertise being available and functioning 
wel l .  One aspect of using locally recruited interpreters is that they 
will naturally enough have their own local loyalty to think about. 
Interpreters who operate in their local environment can often have 
problems with local rulers if they do not act loyal ly towards them . 
We see here that the very fact that one is interested in recruiting 
local people can a lso lead to other problems. These matters should, 
in any case, always be thought through when considering employing 
the services of local ly recruited interpreters. 
An interesting feature, particularly with regard to Afghanistan, 
and it is a lso clearly an operational factor in Iraq, is that both societies 
have lengthy and relatively 'mil itant' traditions. The environment has 
developed attitudes in the population where, as part of their own 
ordinary strategy for survival, they have learned to avoid problems 
either by trying to evade, confuse or outmanoeuvre their adversaries. 
Loyalty is nothing permanent here, except to one's own family, clan 
or other close and long-lasting connections.72 In Afghanistan, they 
say: 'You cannot buy an Afghan, just rent him'. An interesting point 
to make is also that because of strong loyalty to their own clan, 
72 Anthony H.  Cordesman, The Lessons of Afghanistan: War Fighting, Intelligence, and Force 
Transformation (Washington, D.C. :  The CSIS Press, Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, 2002), see especially Chapters 3 and 4. 
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people tend to keep their tongue until the clan leader gives his 
permission to talk  to 'outsiders'. This is of cause a problem in 
connection with col lection of intell igence. It is a lso very important to 
have access to well trained analysts - information without proper 
trained analysts to evaluate the information, wil l be of l imited value 
for the mi l itary and political operations. 
It a lso proved to be the case in Iraq that the census data was 
rather worthless when they began to prepare for the recently held 
election for the new national assembly in the country. As regards the 
preparations for the election, they had to create a new list based on 
sources as dissimilar as Ba'ath party membership, police l ists, mil itary 
rolls and various local municipal or religious l ists. It is on this basis 
that they then developed the foundation for the electoral register 
used during the election . Such census data is in itself important 
intel l igence data when one is to attempt to develop a strategy to 
combat an ongoing insurgency. But the most important information 
about who is who and who actually makes the decisions in a given 
area would perhaps be better produced by studying family ties, by 
drawing up matrices of who associates and trades with who, and 
particularly if one can find out who controls the cash flow. As 
previously indicated, it is necessary to develop and employ police 
methods if success is to be achieved, as local knowledge based on 
information from the local population has traditional ly proved to be 
perhaps the most important individual factor regarding effective 
counter-insurgency. And when the necessary intell igence picture has 
been created, it is obviously a prerequisite that one possesses wel l­
trained forces that can quickly and effectively move in and neutral ise 
or arrest known insurgents. 
But the type of technique described above only works if one has 
much local knowledge and these techniques are not always useful 
when one is attempting to expose foreign infiltrators and border 
crossers. In the last two cases, an effective and non-corrupt border 
control is probably the most important factor, along with a requirement 
that everyone m ust have, and possibly ca rry around, va l i d  
identification papers. In  the case of Iraq, we can assume that 
identification papers from the old regime are not reliable instruments. 
The implementation of a new system for identifying the population 
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cannot be carried out by corrupt, and often infiltrated, local security 
forces. During the phase in which new ID papers are registered and 
issued, there is always a great danger of the insurgents being able 
to obtain false or dual identities. In this context, it is a lso important 
for intel l igence work that one has good maps and knows something 
about who real ly owns land and bui ldings. Traditional ly, such 
information, together with analysis work and an insight into how the 
local or key leaders think, has been important as regards the more 
successful counter-insurgencies. Finding out who are the secret 
supporters when combating an urban guerri l la, also has much of the 
characteristics of police detective work. · The questions one usually 
asks are: 
1. Who is this? (The identity is to be investigated - leaders of 
insurgencies often have several al iases.) 
2. Who does the person usual ly associate with? 
3 .  Who is the person's closest working partner? 
4. What actually is his background? 
5. Which people are closely related to the person in question and 
where do they l ive? 
6. Al lies wi l l ing to be involved (and/or who can be assumed to be 
loyal to whom)? 
American theorists in the field of war studies/mi l itary science 
constantly state that good intel ligence, a better capacity for joint 
and combined operations, better co-operation between the many 
intel l igence organisations and the CIA in particu lar, should be 
combined with increased flexibility/adaptabil ity to carry out so-called 
'just in time' operations.73 Developing, systemising and classifying 
this type of large amounts of data is a demanding and often not very 
exciting job for those given this task; however, without being able to 
develop this classification and using it, it is extremely difficult, 
73 Direct access to detailed quality information at lower levels from 'Other Government 
Agencies' (OGA) as CIA paramilitary forces and Special Forces. is becoming more and more 
important in the U .S. military system. See a interesting description of the new way of doing 
intelligence operations in Robin Moore, Hunting Down Saddam: The Inside Story of the 
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particularly in large cities, to find and overcome terrorist and guerril la 
groups. 74 Here, good computer support and adapted software are a 
prerequisite for effective work. The data will, in turn, be used as the 
basis for analysis work, provide the basis for how one should prioritise 
police and mi l itary efforts and provide the foundations for the 
evaluation of threats and so-cal led 'force protection', etc. This is 
nothing new. As early as in the 1970s, British intel l igence developed 
a system of archive pictures of houses in Republican areas of Northern 
Ireland. Soldiers, who were to examine these houses, could, by means 
of this system, find out whether the house had a cel lar or how the 
various items of furniture were arranged. Eventually, this information 
was put on computer along with information such as the movements 
of suspected IRA terrorists.75 But British intelligence probably had 
more resources and time per insurgent in Northern Ireland than the 
Americans have in today's Iraq. 
On 12 September 1992, Peruvian intell igence swooped on a house 
in the capital, Lima.  After thorough intell igence work, which included 
the monitoring and analysis of household waste from the house, 
they managed to arrest the Maoist guerril la's uncontested leader, 
'President Gonzalo' (real name Abimael Guzman).76This would prove 
to be a decisive blow against the guerri l la forces that were extremely 
dependent on this leader figure.77 
As previously demonstrated, the need for intell igence wil l be 
particularly great in connection with al l  forms of counter-insurgency. 
Intell igence has a lways been extremely demanding and dangerous 
for those carrying out these tasks with regard to counter-insurgency. 
Search and Capture, Foreword by Mark Vargas (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2004), see 
last Chapter, pp 227-257. 
1• A possible problem is that the traditional way to organise Western S2 and G2 sections in 
the Headquarter at battalion, brigade and Divisional level, are organised to function well in 
modern conventional warfare. In counter-insurgency warfare analysing many "bits and pieces" 
coming inn from a lot of different sources, needs a robust staffing. One need to tailor the staff 
according to the actual needs in the different conflicts. 
75 Mark Urban, Big Boys' Rules: SAS and the Secret Struggle against the IRA (London: 
Faber and Faber, 200 1 ), pp. 1 1 6- 1 1 7. 
76 A. J. Joes (1 996), ibid . ,  pp. 1 51 -52. 
77 More systematic presentations of successful collection and analysis methods are described 
in two articles. See, for instance, Colleen Mccue, Emily S. Stone, and Teresa P. Gooch, 
'Data Mining and Value-Added Analysis', FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, (November 2003), 
pp. 3-4. See also the article written by Famaz Fassihi, 'Two Novice Gumshoes Charted the 
Capture of Saddam Hussein', The Wall Street Journal, 1 8  January 2004, p. 1 .  
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It is a lso clear that this type of intell igence work is, in reality, 
very different from the type of field intelligence work that is normal ly 
carried out at a tactical and operational level i n  connection with 
conventional warfare. One main difference is that the guerri l la war is 
normally of a lengthy duration and this form of conflict takes its 
character from the local community it takes place in .  Obviously, 
modern technology and the use of more police collection and analysis 
methods can be good aids and these measures, combined with 
traditional collection methods such as patrols and the use of agents, 
contribute overall to the necessary intell igence picture. It is important 
for the local population to be able to tip off the authorities without 
having to walk into a police station or be seen talking to a patrol .  
This is usually done by means of a system using an anonymous 'tip­
off phone'. The danger is obviously of this being abused during private 
vendettas. If, however, one is dealing with a sophisticated insurgent 
movement, the latter wil l make sure that the tip-off phone is inundated 
with false tips. 
As already indicated, a large amount of different data is required 
in order to be able to organise and lead an effective counter­
insurgency and this data must be classified, analysed and, finally, 
one must have the wil l  and abi lity to strike and render harmless (or 
at least neutralise) the insurgent groups and leaders one is up against. 
There is also good reason to take note of the following wise words of 
Karen Armstrong : 
Precise intelligence is essential in any conflict. It is important to 
know who our enemies are, but equally crucial to know who they 
are not. It is even more vital to avoid turning potential friends into 
foes. By making the disciplined effort to name our enemies correctly, 
we will learn more about them, and come one step nearer, perhaps, 
to solving the seemingly intractable and increasingly perilous 
problems of our divided world. 78 
Gradually, as more information about the planning of this war 
has emerged, it has proved to be the case that the American side 
had clearly not undertaken the necessary consideration about how 
they would tackle the period after the actual conventional war was 
1• Karen Armstrong, 'The label of Catholic terror was never used about the IRA'. The Guardian, 
July 1 1 ,  2005. 
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won.  The Americans and other major European powers conducted 
many lengthy counter-insurgencies, so-cal led COIN campaigns from 
1940s to the 1970s. In Vietnam and elsewhere in South-East Asia, in 
Africa and in Latin America a series of wars have been conducted 
during the entire period mentioned - wars that are, in some cases, 
ongoing . Theoretica l ly, we should have lots of historical experiences 
to make use of, but it has often proved difficult to learn from the 
earlier mistakes of others. Some of the previous lessons will, however, 
be emphasised further on in this book. 
In the aftermath of the apparently effective conventional war 
against Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq in the spring of 2003, it has 
proved difficult to create a new, stable pol itica l and economic 
development in  the country. The U.S. is at the head of a coalition 
where Great Britain is the only other Western state contributing large 
mil itary efforts in Iraq. The other participating states are al l  making 
smaller mil itary contributions, and many Western states have already 
left Iraq. 
4. Counter-insurgency - what is important? 
Are the United States and Western forces in general able to 
combat lengthy guerri l la warfare? Debate over this question has been 
going on constantly during the entire period since 1945 . The large 
number of conflicts of this type is in itself evidence that it is real ly 
political and social antagonism that is trying to be resolved by mil itary 
means through the aforementioned wars/conflicts. 
The large number of conflicts of a guerri l la nature itself suggests 
that there must be clear advantages associated with fighting a guerril la 
or insurgent war. When an insurgent movement is wel l  led and one 
chooses the right strategy and manages to adhere to real istic 
objectives, it has proved possible to win this type of war, i .e., force 
the desired pol itica l, economic, psychological and final ly mi l itary 
col lapse of the ru ling regime in the state under attack. It is necessary 
for the ru l ing regime to put in significant effort if it is to be successful 
in combating this type of warfare. This wil l require lengthy efforts, 
and the psychological efforts necessary in order to regain positive 
control of its own population should be seen as particu larly 
demanding . 
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Normally it will be an objective of a competent regime threatened 
by a large insurgency to attempt to divide the population from the 
insurgent movement. Even if it were to be successful in dividing the 
population from the insurgent movement, this does not, however, 
automatical ly mean the regime gaining legitimacy among the people. 
It has proved particularly difficult to establish durable legitimacy where 
the regime deploys physical methods such as, for example, the 
compulsory movement of the population to 'strategic vil lages'. There 
are also several types of insurgent movements that do not necessarily 
need a population in order to support themselves. A guerri l la force 
with a strong foreign sponsor will belong to this group. An ethnically 
based insurgent movement that operates in another ethnic national 
group's area will normally have to force support. Without the ruling 
regime having legitimacy among the majority of people, psychological 
defeat may eventually be what causes the ruling regime to fal l ,  not 
necessari ly a clearly defined mi l itary defeat. 
A constant problem, particularly during the early phase of an 
insurgency, is that the insurgents cannot expect to win in combat 
against the regime's ordinary mil itary forces, and there are probably 
few historical examples of many smal l  guerrilla attacks in themselves 
being enough to defeat a mil itarily strong regime. This is a lso one of 
the reasons why most successful guerri l la organisations that have 
succeeded in taking over government in a country have conducted a 
lengthy war, something that requires a long-term perspective of the 
political struggle and warfare. In other words, it requires both patience 
and a strong will to keep the war going. It has also proved to be the 
case that the theories concerning guerri l la war that exist are hardly 
of a 'universal '  nature. This applies, to a greater or lesser extent, to 
most theories that have been used by both guerri l la and terrorist 
movements and those fighting against these.79 The participants that 
79 It is not uncommon for some insurgent groups to be accused of being involved in criminal 
activity, such as the drugs trade. The Colombian insurgent movements FARC and ELN are 
often presented as examples of drug-funded insurgent movements, something both groups 
deny. In 1 980, the Maoist guerrilla movement in Peru began its armed struggle and was 
almost immediately called 'narco-terrorists' by the country's authorities. An alleged or real 
combination of insurgency and drug trading would obviously mean the boundaries between 
counter-insurgency and the fight against drugs becoming correspondingly hazy. lf we study 
the US security policies vis-Ill-vis some Latin American countries, it is not always easy to see 
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have been able to make good local adjustments on the basis of 
avai lable theories and historical experiences and who have, at the 
same time, been able to carry out the necessary changes in both 
tactics and their long-term strategies have normally succeeded best. 
When it comes to Mao's theories on protracted warfare, where 
the insurgents base themselves in rural areas and then encircle the 
towns in the next phase, it is d ifficult to see that things have worked 
this way in Latin America . In Peru, El Salvador, Guatemala and 
Colombia, so-cal led long-term strategies have only served to give 
the governments time to react, reform and develop a strategy for 
counter-insurgency. Obviously, the US has not been standing on the 
sidelines waiting for a country to fal l  to an insurgent movement. The 
two revolutions that actually have taken place, in Cuba and Nicaragua, 
have both ended in victories for the revolutionaries as a result of the 
insurgent movements exploiting a time-limited situation where there 
were serious political crises in the two countries.80 
It has proved to be the case historical ly that insurgency through 
guerri l la warfare has often been successful, but there is absolutely 
nothing to say that a lengthy insurgency will automatical ly always 
succeed. Guerri l la groups have their own weaknesses and l imitations. 
For instance, if a guerri l la movement has to survive under difficult 
physical and  psychologica l  cond itions, pa rticu larly  in those 
where the fight against drugs stops and counter-insurgency begins. For example, a great 
deal of assistance has gone to Colombian 'anti-drugs battalions' (See, for example, Angel 
Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and 
Its Implications for Regional Stability (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 200 1 ) ,  pp. 62-63.) .  From 
the end of the 1 980s, there was, in Peru, a risk of being stopped by Peruvian DEA forces in 
areas in which the Maoists were active. At a time when American support for a counter­
insurgency would have been controversial, these forces were armed and uniformed like a 
military force. It is important to understand this link between counter-insurgency and the 
fight against drugs as it has broad political and popular support in the US. Afghanistan also 
falls within this context. The US would perhaps like to establish bases in the long-term, not 
just as a means of having a presence in order to politically influence Pakistan and the region 
in general, but as a means of reducing opium production. 
00 If we compare Maoist strategy for guerrilla warfare with Che Guevara's so-called 'foco' 
theory for guerrilla warfare, we see that this is not based on the same fundamental ideas. 
Both Cuba and Nicaragua were the result of a revolution in accordance with foco principles, 
not a Maoist people's war as such. It is outside the framework of this book to go into the 
differences in greater detail .  See also Jon Lee Anderson, Che Guevara: sUJndig mot segern 
1928-1959 [Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life] (Stockholm: Leopard fOrlag, 2002), and 
particularly Ernesto Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Vintage, 1 969). 
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i nsurgencies that have a strong core group of ideologically motivated 
leaders, it is not uncommon to see a factionalisation and an internal 
splitaft.er a period . 
It is probably possible to establish some fundamental guidelines 
with regard to what one should/should not do but, if an insurgency 
is to succeed, the principles one follows must be adapted to the 
individual situation .  The same obviously applies to those combating 
an insurgency. One must have an insight into local conditions and 
the conceptions and attitudes that apply here. 
a. Counter-insurgency - must it be relearned each time? 
In many ways, we can see that the debate on counter-insurgency 
has been g iven fresh impetus and new content as a result of the 
'continuation war' in Iraq from the summer of 2003. One symbol of 
this could be how the former American Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld described further developments in Iraq in  a memorandum 
from the middle of October 2003. Here, he speculated whether the 
American forces were prepared to deal with a lengthy guerri l la war 
in Iraq. The memorandum triggered lengthy debates in US mi l itary 
circles and the debate focused on what is required of modern counter­
insurgents and what will work in connection with COIN as a concept 
of combat. From April 2004, the debate picked up fresh momentum 
given the rapid escalation of the use of violence against the coalition 
forces in Iraq and Iraqis who supported and helped them or the new 
political regime. 
An examination of several of the leading Western journals has 
shown that, during the period from about 1990 to today, in clear 
contrast to the period from about 1950 to 1980, almost no theoretical 
works had been written about the more important aspects of counter­
insurgency. 81 Instead, in  these same mil itary journals in  the 1990's, 
they wrote of phenomena such as 'Revolution in Mil itary Affairs' (RMA) 
and 'RMA-associated technologies', with the main emphasis normally 
•1 This applies to most leading journals that are receptive to so-called strategic studies and 
similar political and military theory works. Frank Cass (taken over by the Taylor and Francis 
Group in 2004) in London has, however, published some smaller 'simple' journals that are 
receptive to articles about the various forms of guerrilla warfare and terrorism, where counter­
insurgency is part of the content of the articles in the journals. 
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on com mand and control developments, the introduction of various 
forms of precision weapons systems and the associated so-cal led 
'targeting' processes. In particular, the American debate on what 
was seen as the battleground of the future and the description of 
the operational art that would fit in there has been extremely focused 
on technology and organisation, particularly up to September 1 1, 
2001 .  
In  other words, i t  i s  primarily the conventiona/battleground with 
war between states that has been at the centre of this development 
- not how war would look in the Third World, or when well-organised 
terrorist groups were at large against Western states or their al lies, 
with 'other means' than conventional advanced weapons systems 
and forces. 
Apart from the introductory American RMA debate of the 1990's 
and the later, equally technical ly focused discussion on 'Network­
Centric Warfare' (NCW) from the end of the 1990's the debate is 
now changing. The catchwords 'Effects-Based Operations' (EBO) and 
'Effects-Based Approach to Operations' (EBAO), have forced their 
way into the debate since 2001, and especially EBO/EBAO has partially 
dislodged RMA and NCW (but NCW is sti l l  used about the networked 
technologies). Together, these four concepts could be said to represent 
the core of Western mil itary debate in the period after the end of the 
Cold War. Paral lel with this 'pure mil itary' debate, another debate 
has been going on where concepts such as 'nation-building' and the 
various forms of 'peacekeeping' have been discussed . It is a lso of 
interest for developments today that the so-called 'nation-building 
operations' of the 1990's, l ike those we saw in the Balkans, were 
not, in practice, faced with a determined and violent insurgent 
movement that deliberately attacked those who came to ensure new 
social developments. The developments in the wars in the Balkans 
coincided with the not insignificant skil ls developed, for instance, in 
the US with regard to counter-insurgency in the 1960's and 1970's 
within  the pol itica l leadership being now on the wane. A new 
generation of officials without political or personal experience of the 
earlier so-ca l led 'counter-insurgency era' that can be considered to 
have ended at the end of the 1970's had, in the 1990's, taken over 
the majority of top positions. 
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Simi la rly, if we look at the special ist l iterature deal ing with 
insurgency and terrorism from the period from about 1980 to 2000, 
a lot has been written about terrorism in extremely general terms 
but little about the problem that has now become much more acute : 
how a determined insurgent movement organises and implements 
strategic campaigns of terror in order to destabil ise the actual nation­
building, as we now see happening in Iraq. Here, it is often enough 
for the insurgents that the state forces fai l  to re-establ ish the 
government - the insurgents do not need to take over the 
administration of the state themselves, and the government collapses. 
It is clearly uncertain how the insurgents have actually been able to 
develop long-term plans in Iraq. Some groups are probably most 
preoccupied with getting the Americans out, something that is most 
in keeping with the 'short-term ideology' we typical ly find in insurgent 
movements.  But there is probably an element of more ambitious 
plans in some of the active resistance groups - often with thinking 
that takes its inspiration from a mixture of ethnicity and rel igion . 
According to adherents of these type of visions, a new 'state of God', 
'righteous social order' or 'Cal iphate on Earth' wi l l  arise from the 
chaos prevail ing, depending on the country or area studied . This 
'new order' will then be led by the insurgents/terrorists or their 'chosen 
ones', as most modern insurgent movements probably see it. 
b. What can we learn from the past? 
Due to developments in Iraq, we have, in  2005 - 2007, seen 
increasingly more frequent references to what are rather inexact 
historical paral lels with the Vietnam War. The majority of contributions 
that I have seen to the ongoing debate, particularly in the media, 
but also in individual articles in mil itary journals, have been less able 
to draw very convincing parallels between the wars in Indochina/ 
Vietnam and what is going on in Iraq today. 
The world has actually changed greatly in the intervening period, 
particularly through the superpower confrontation between the Soviet 
Union and the US now being gone, something that makes it almost 
impossible for insurgents to play on the clear pol itica l l i nes of 
confrontation from the 1960s. This was a situation that the Communist 
leadership in  Vietnam in particular was able to exploit in a convincing 
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manner in the 1960s and early 1970s. The lessons from Vietnam 
and, for example, Northern Ireland have in the intervening period 
left their mark on military experiential material, something that has 
contributed to increasing the distinction between American and British 
attitudes to how one should deal with UC. 
The different insurgent factions in Iraq have not, so far, been 
able to develop a countrywide and consistently led insurgent 
movement, even if certain forms of 'tactical cooperation' between 
militant factions were seen for the first time in April 2004. The different 
mi l itias and other forms of insurgent groups actual ly only agree on 
the coalition troops leaving Iraq as soon as possible - a rather l imited 
basis on which to build any future collaboration . The clashes between 
the religious or ethnical organised mil itias and the corresponding 
'ethnical cleansing' of mixed living areas, and ki l l ing of persons from 
the other group, have created many dead and a grooving refugee 
problem in Iraq . There is actually no agreement on what the different 
mi l itias agree on politica lly, who should lead the insurgency, which 
religious interpretation should dominate and how the state of Iraq 
should look. In a situation l ike this, the possibil ity of a civil war as 
soon as the al l ied troops have pul led out is great. 
Knowledge, insight and experiences from the many previous 
guerri l la wars mean that these should be studied afresh . There is 
every reason to believe that, over the next few years, we will be 
faced with a greater number of terrorist movements with 'g lobal' 
perspectives to their terrorist activity, in clear contrast to the patterns 
that have dominated since the Second World War, i .e ., that a local ly 
recruited and oriented guerril la or terrorist organisation primarily 
attacks the local government's forces and symbols in a situation similar 
to civil war. Help was, however, often available from abroad, such as 
practical and moral support from groups (and possibly countries) 
outside the a rea in which the war was going on, but there was less 
danger of the conflict 'spreading' to other parts of the world. The 
local insurgents' cause was often too much of a local nature for 
people without a background from this g iven country/area to want 
to become involved in the cause. Some examples of this type of 
'international ,  but nevertheless primari ly loca l '  struggle a re the 
Basque's terrorism through ETA in Spain, the IRA in Northern Ireland 
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(and sporadic attacks elsewhere in Great Britain) and the 'Red Army' 
faction in West Germany (in the 1970s). 
Without studying previous insurgencies and the attempts at 
counter-insurgency that have gone on - including understanding that 
the historical conditions for the individual insurgencies will obviously 
be subject to change - it is difficult to know what one can possibly 
learn from previous attempts at combating insurgencies or controll ing 
these. In particular: 
1 .  Which lessons from previous counter- insurgencies a re of 
relevance to a current insurgency/insurgencies? 
2. Which operational and theoretical problems are topical for today's 
situation, e .g., in Iraq or the Middle East in general? 
3. It is also important to find an answer as to whether the same 
factors wil l have equal importance in, for example, Africa or Asia.  
The Americans in particular used a lot of resources and undertook 
comprehensive research efforts in Vietnam in order to better 
understand what was happening there . They also developed various 
so-cal led 'counter-insurgency campaigns' but it proved to be difficult 
to implement these, particularly when both the South Vietnamese 
political leadership and sections of the American mil itary and political 
administration were, in practice, more interested in more conventional 
military solutions. All in al l ,  the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 
became a symbol of something that the Americans did not, in the 
'spirit of the age', want to have any more of: large-scale American 
involvement in a Second or Third World country of m inor importance. 
But there was one area where the Americans continued to spend 
money, and that was the intell igence sector. During the entire period, 
they attached great importance to the use of and requirement for 
function ing i ntel l igence services. The US a lso took note of 
developments in the many Third World conflicts during the period, 
but if we ignore conflicts in the US's back yard of Latin America in 
particular, the Americans were, after 1975, rarely directly involved 
outside Korea and in Europe, at least as long as the Cold War went 
on. 
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Nor can one have any hope of 'winning' or achieving success in 
the many smal ler conflicts going on without the well-developed use 
of the collection of information and the analysis of intel l igence. 
Another experience could possibly be that governments (presumably) 
in Spain and (definitely) in Northern Ireland, at the same time as 
using mi l itary means, also had a secret political dialogue with the 
actual terrorist organisations. 
As previously indicated, in our present time, a great number of 
insurgencies directed at rul ing regimes have been going on, mostly 
in the Third World .  In addition, there have been various terrorist 
activities. The majority of the actual terrorist groups sti l l  have an 
internalfocus. But the activity represented by the more internationally 
organised and recruited terrorist systems, of which al-Qaeda is the 
foremost symbol, have developed other 'forms of combat' and are 
more international than the more typical local (or, at most, regional) 
insurgent and terrorist organisations. The latter normal ly operate 
within the territory of a country or, at most, in neighbouring countries, 
while al-Qaeda has 'taken responsibil ity for' fighting Western interests 
(particularly American ones) and 'unfaithful' Arab regimes where the 
opportunity presents itself. The latter activity requires a more 
advanced theoretical and technical superstructure than loca l 
insurgency. Those groups 'belonging to' a l -Qaeda have a lso 
demonstrated a great aptitude for long-term planning and a more 
conscious selection of both targets and victims than the more 
traditional internal insurgent movements. The wil l ingness to use 
violence is, however, the same: 'anybody' seen as an 'enemy of the 
insurgents� and what they stand for, is to be threatened and, if 
necessary, destroyed by means of the systematic use of violent 
methods.82 
82 The establishment of a common leadership (abbreviated to SOCOM) for consistent 
leadership of all Special Forces had/has the objective of building bridges between the 
conventional forces and unconventional missions. This force, about 30.000 in size, has in 
many ways trained exactly for direct collaboration with other countries' political and military 
institutions (called Foreign Internal Defence activities). The United States has, therefore, to 
some extent, seen the need which is discussed previously in this point, and has tried to do 
something about it. 
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c. What will the chal lenges be for those combating terror 
and insurgency? 
If Western forces are to be able to be used effectively against 
the ongoing insurgent and terrorist activities, either in  the West or 
as 'advanced operations' in the Second and Third Worlds, where the 
most violent conflicts are going on today, it is necessary to have 
knowledge of what characterises this form of lengthy confl ict: what 
causes it to break out, who normally leads and recruits for the actual 
guerri l la or terrorist organisations, what the conflicts are al leged to 
be about and, especial ly, whether there are other or previous conflicts 
that one could possibly learn something from. Important factors are :  
1 .  It is to establish the facts about the outbreak of an insurgency. 
2. Who are the recruits and who the leaders to an actual insurgency? 
3. What are the background for the actual conflict? What do the 
involved factions say about themselves and about their enemies? 
4. And, and this is important, is there other earlier similarconflict 
which you can learn from? 
If one assumes that one's soldiers (and possibly also police) 
may become involved in this type of conflict, with or without, the 
UN, NATO, or the EU as a so-cal led 'legitimising authority' - it is 
important that both one's own political and mil itary leadership at 
least have some insight into what characterises this type of operation. 
The leadership should also know something about what counter­
insurgency is and understand what will be required if one's own 
troops are to be deployed in a conflict that may often be far from 
home. 
Seen in this l ight, both research and fresh mil itary insight wi l l  be 
required if one is to be able to meet the new chal lenges. Research 
and the necessary adjustment to the existing forces so that they wil l  
be able to carry out mil itary operations in other parts of the world, 
based on other operational art and tactics than they are used to at 
home, wil l also be necessary if one is to be able to deal with the 
violent and clearly anti-Western bias. 
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One must obviously a lso has an insight into what characterises 
the modern forms of insurgency: 
1 .  Changes in our present time, seen i n  comparison with what was 
experienced during the decolonisation conflicts of the 1950s and 
1960s. 
2. Simi larities and differences with regard to what the Americans 
and other great powers learned from the attempts to 'stem the 
flow of Communism' from the middle of 1960s to about 1975 
(the first 'counter-insurgency era'). 
3. The possible consequences of the more diffuse and often 
religiously inspired insurgencies and terrorist schemes with their 
base in the Middle East that are, primari ly, directed at the West 
and Western values in general and, secondly, at the local groups 
that want to modernise society in a Western way. We now see 
clear features of this nature in the ongoing insurgencies in places 
l ike Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine. 
4. Conflicts must also be seen in relation to the integrated position 
that the Nordic countries and others have in the global community 
and a country's military exposure and the subsequent potential 
vulnerabil ity that today's participation level could result in should 
be taken into account. 
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Ringkasan Artikel 
Dalam suatu keadaan di mana terdapat perang pemberontakan 
dan pelaksanaan kontra insurgensi, maka pihak yang bertindak 
memerangi pemberontakan tidak akan dapat meraih dukungan yang 
luas sampai mayoritas masyarakat dapat diyakinkan bahwa pihak 
yang memerangi pemberontakan memil iki kemauan, sumber daya 
dan kemampuan untuk menang. Sebaliknya, ciri-ciri pemberontakan 
yang bersifat terus menerus dapat terlihat ketika mereka dapat 
membuat kekacauan dengan mudah dan hal tersebut sangat sulit 
dicegah, yang menggambarkan keadaan seperti itu sebagai konfl ik 
asimetris, di mana telah terjadi ketidakseimbangan kekuatan (aset 
dan kemampuan) antara pihak yang saling berhadapan. Keistimewaan 
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dari semua perang pemberontakan atau perang gerilya adalah upaya 
yang di lakukan untuk menghindari bentrokan langsung dengan 
kekuatan utama angkatan bersenjata negara, atau penguasaan 
terhadap pos-pos terdepan, sistem logistik dan garnisun-garnisun 
kecil pada waktu dan tempat yang tidak diduga. Gambaran tersebut 
menunjukkan setidaknya terdapat perbedaan antara gerakan 
pemberontakan dan kontra-insurgensi. 
Menurut David Galula, penggabungan antara operasi mi l iter dan 
non-mi l iter akan dapat mengalahkan pemberontaka n .  Hal in i  
memerlukan fungsi organisasi yang tetap untuk suatu kekuasaan 
dalam mengkoordinasikan unsur-unsur politik, sosial, ekonomi dan 
mi l iter. Ia berpendapat bahwa usaha kontra-insurgensi memerlukan 
kesatuan komando sebagai satu-satunya sumber yang memberikan 
arahan serta organisasi yang disiplin dan ketat dalam mengarahkan 
operasi dari awal h ingga akhir, walaupun untuk itu pihak mil iter 
tidaklah bebas di ijinkan begitu saja dalam melaksanakan operasi 
tersebut, sehingga tindakan mil iter hanyalah merupakan tindakan 
kedua dibandingkan dengan tindakan politik. 
Sejak tahun  1945, terdapat lebih dari 80 jenis gerakan 
pemberontakan yang berbeda-beda, yang mayoritasnya merupakan 
perang gerilya . Berkenaan dengan hal tersebut, maka ada beberapa 
hal yang dapat dilakukan untuk membangun kepercayaan masyarakat 
dan pengumpulan data intelijen, misalnya : pelaksanaan patroli rutin 
yang dilakukan berdasarkan misi tertentu yang jelas dan dikontrol 
oleh pemimpin mil iter; efektivitas penangkapan berdasarkan wilayah 
lebih diutamakan daripada pengawasan permanen atas suatu wilayah; 
penggunaan pos terdepan secara efektif dan komunikatif; serta 
meniadakan 'garis depan' yang tidak ada dalam bentuk peperangan 
jenis in i .  Selain itu, maka rejim pemerintahan yang ada harus 
terorganisir dengan baik dan selalu memil iki keinginan politik untuk 
mengatasi pemberontakan. 
Dicontohkan bahwa aspek-aspek yang bersifat non-mi l iter 
seringkali berkorelasi positif dengan upaya untuk memenangkan 
perang melawan pemberontakan. Sebagai contoh, ketika Inggris 
selama bertahun-tahun berperang melawan pemberontakan Cina di 
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Malaysia dari tahun 1948 sampai tahun 1962, maka pihak Inggris 
berhasil beradaptasi dengan situasi setempat, dan dapat menguasar 
wilayah pedesaan komunis tempat gerakan gerilyawan. Angkatan 
Bersenjata Inggris yang memiliki pengalaman dan budaya organisasi 
sebagai 'polisi kolonial', mampu menggunakan pasuka-n lokal dan 
mempelajari tradisi-tradisi setempat, sehingga adanya hubungan yang 
erat antara operasi mi l iter dan tujuan utama d i  bidang pol itik 
merupakan faktor yang sangat penting untuk mencapai keberhasilan. 
Hal i ni sangat bertolak belakang dalam perang Vietnam yang 
berlangsung dari tahun 1958 hingga 1972, di mana pihak Amerika 
Seri kat kurang berhasi l da lam upaya mereka menciptaka n 
kemenangan dari kontra-insurgensi yang lama.  Dalam perang 
tersebut, terbukti bahwa tidak mungkin mengalahkan kepemimpinan 
Komunis yang mempunyai motivasi tinggi, yang berpusat di Vietnam 
Utara, karena rejim tersebut dapat diterima dalam masyarakat. 
Sebaliknya pihak Amerika Serikat tidak ingin beradaptasi dengan 
keadaan setempat, bahkan Vietnam Utara dapat tetap menjadi basis 
atas suplai dan masuknya pasukan ke wilayah pertempuran .  
Clausewits da lam bukunya "On War" menyatakan bahwa 
pemahaman mengenai jenis perang yang sedang terjadi sangatlah 
penting, karena pada hakekatnya perang dapat dilihat sebagai sesuatu 
yang konstan; berlainan dengan metode dan teknik berperang yang 
selalu berubah-ubah. Kelompok-kelompok yang merupakan para 
'aktor bukan negara' tidaklah dianggap dapat melakukan konflik 
asimetris berdasarkan aksi dan motivasi yang mereka lakukan.  
Kelompok ini  umumnya melakukan operasi mereka berdasarkan 
jaringan tanpa garis komando yang jelas, tanpa menggunakan aturan­
aturan pelibatan tertentu dalam hal taktik penghancuran  suatu 
sasaran .  Sebal iknya, mereka mudah untuk beradaptasi untuk 
melakukan tindakan balasan dan mampu untuk tetap menjaga 
motivasi dalam operasi-operasi mereka, sebagaimana digambarkan 
dalam kelompok Al-Qaeda . Sehingga dengan demikian, dasar-dasar 
konflik yang terjadi memang harus benar-benar diteliti . 
Perbedaan yang penting antara kontra-insurgensi dan keadaan 
di mana tentara dua negara bersama-sama dalam suatu pertempuran 
besar yaitu dalam kontra insurgensi hampir selalu penduduk sipil 
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menjadi bahan pertimbangan. Larangan bagi angkatan bersenjata 
untuk menentukan tindakan sendiri selama kontra-insurgensi 
ditujukan untuk mencegah jatuhnya korban yang tidak berdosa . 
Dengan kata la in ,  da lam hal  kontra- i nsurgensi,  pengertian  
keberhasilan biasanya sama dengan memiliki keberhasi lan dalam 
bidang militer dan politik yang dapat memungkinkan polisi sipil untuk 
terus menjaga keamanan internal di masa yang akan datang. 
Kontra-insurgensi biasanya merupakan pertempuran  yang 
sangat panjang dan bertahun-tahun, sehingga keberhasi lan untuk 
memenangkannya tidaklah dapat diukur dengan adanya 'kemenangan 
mutlak' berdasarkan operasi mil iter. Sejarah menunjukkan bahwa 
dalam pertempuran demikian, peperangan akan banyak mengalami 
perubahan di dalam suatu periode. Oleh karena itu, Angkatan 
Bersenjata yang efektif harus mempunyai kemampuan untuk merubah 
teknik dan cara bertempur serta waktu yang diperlukan untuk 
melakukan perubahan tersebut, sehingga cara bertempur lebih 
ditujukan untuk mematahkan, mendelegitimasi, memutuskan mata 
rantai, menurunkan moral serta menghancurkan sumber-sumber daya 
musuh. Oleh karena itu, misalnya, penguasaan atas wilayah atau 
suatu kota, tidak terlalu penting dalam kontra-insurgensi j ika 
dibandingkan dengan penguasaan terhadap jalur-jalur logistik dan 
komunikasi, karena hal itu merupakan hambatan serius bagi gerakan 
pem berontakan .Untuk mencapai keberhasi lan tersebut, maka 
diusulkan cara yang lebih komprehensif dengan melibatkan beberapa 
kelompok khusus seperti kelompok khusus regional, inelijen dari unsur 
masyarakat, polisi, atau perwira dengan pengalaman operasional, 
sehingga dapat diupayakan kemenangan militer dan politik. Dalam 
hal ini ada tiga faktor yang dianggap penting, yaitu : pertimbangan 
jumlah korban yang tidak diharapkan dan hasil dari aktivitas sendiri, 
yang semuanya akan menentukan pemilihan taktik; sistem umpan 
balik sampai ke tingkat 'akar rumput' pada organisasi mi l iter dan 
jaminan bahwa komunikasi yang konstan tetap terjalin; serta adanya 
penggunaan para pelaku di tingkat rendah (pelaku lapangan), karena 
merekalah yang paling mengetahui jika sesuatu hal tidak berjalan 
dengan baik. 
Berkenaan dengan hal itulah maka penting untuk menguasai 
suatu pusat serangan (centre of gravity/ CoG) di mana masyarakat 
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memberikan dukungan kepada pemberontak, karena inti ancaman 
yang sesungguhnya adalah potensi politik pemberontak dan bukan 
kemampuan mil iter pemberontak yang terbatas. Untuk itu, maka 
kontra-insurgensi yang efektif harus memiliki beberapa 'garis operasi' 
(lines of operation) yang bekerja pada saat yang bersamaan seperti 
garis militer, sosial, ekonomi dan hukum, yang mana setiap garis 
tersebut membentuk tujuan yang bersifat sementara (decisive point 
/DP), sehingga pada akhirnya tujuan-tujuan tersebutlah (DP) yang 
diarahkan untuk dapat menguasai pusat serangan (CoG). Penentuan 
garis mil iter (DP militer) yang tepat, misalnya dilakukan dengan cara 
mengeluarkan suatu petunjuk rencana operasional (guidance of 
operational planning), yang tentu saja harus membedakan cara 
bertempur dalam perang gerilya dan perang konvensional .  DP hukum 
dapat juga berupa upaya pemul ihan hukum dan ketertiban 
masyarakat, menguasai jalan / komunikasi atau membersihkan 
wilayah 'terlarang' yang dikuasai oleh satuan gerilya. Pelaksanaan 
garis-garis operasi yang baik, pada akhimya dapat mengarah terhadap 
penyesuaian taktik politik sehingga mampu berkontribusi terhadap 
suatu hubungan yang lebih baik dengan masyarakat setempat yang 
sebelumnya hanya cenderung baik terhadap pihak gerilya . 
Dalam kontra-insurgensi, maka pihak angkatan bersenjata harus 
mampu berhadapan dengan pasukan gerilya secara 'simetris'; mampu 
merekrut dan melatih pasukan lokal untuk mengatasi pasukan gerilya 
serta mendapatkan informasi dan data intelijen; mampu mendirikan 
dinas intelijen yang memiliki akses terhadap informasi tentang 
perekrutan gerilyawan, siapa yang direkrut, cara dan tempat dilatih, 
siapa yang memperoleh senjata dan amunisi, bagaimana propaganda 
dan indoktrinasi prajurit gerilya dan jaringan sipil mereka lakukan, 
serta harus mampu memisahkan antara pemberontak dan penduduk 
sipil; ibarat 'mampu menangkap ikan di dalam air'. 
Satuan-satuan yang sering menangani misi kontra-insurgensi 
biasanya terdi ri dari dua komponen; yaitu pasukan militer yang akan 
melakukan tugas intelijen, serangan dadakan dan mengawasi aktivitas 
musuh serta membuat hubungan baik dengan penduduk setempat; 
serta pasukan konvensional yang biasanya berada di bawah 
pengawasan pasukan khusus atau dibawah komando pasukan 
JURNAL HUKUM HUMANITER, Vol.  3, No. 4 
749 Insurgency and Counter Insurgency Some Concepts and Problems 
konvensional itu sendiri, yang akan memberikan bantuan tembakan 
berat. Conteh dalam hal ini adalah pasukan 'Baret Hijau' (Special 
Operation Forces / SOF) atau pasukan khusus Amerika yang 
diterjunka n  selama tahap-tahap pendahuluan perang Vietnam. 
Walaupun demikian, masih terdapat kelemahan, yaitu pelatihan 
khusus kontra-insurgensi ini tidak pernah memadai dan cukup 
dijadikan sebagai dasar dalam metode dan cara berperang Amerika .  
Di samping itu disadari juga bahwa pasukan keamanan dalam jumlah 
besar tetap diper1ukan untuk menjaga ketertiban penduduk di wilayah 
pemberontakan.  Namun demikian, hal ini dapat mengakibatkan 
konsekuensi di mana penugasan pasukan dalam jumlah besar sangat 
tidak efektif untuk menghadapi pasukan gerilya dalam jumlah kecil 
dan berkemampuan terbatas dan sangat 'Hein' dalam beroperasi di 
daerah yang bersimpati kepada mereka. Hal tersebut juga dapat 
meningkatkan permasalahan politik dan dapat mengakibatkan 
penduduk setempat lebih bersimpati kepada pihak gerilya. Berkenaan 
dengan hal  tersebut maka jumlah korban yang jatuh patut 
dipertimbangkan. Oleh karena itu dalam kontra-insurgensi intelijen 
memiliki peranan yang sangat penting. 
Sebagai contoh, dalam perang di Irak, inti pemberontakan 
berpusat di wilayah perkotaan di mana mereka mendapatkan 
dukungan yang luas terutama dari kaum suni .  Mereka memil iki 
pasokan a mu nis i  yang tidak terbatas dan j i ka perl u dapat 
menggunakan born buatan (Improvised Explosive Device / /El!j. 
Dalam keadaan demikian, tidak saja intelijen berdasarkan elektronik 
yang per1u diorganisasikan secara efektif. Perwira intelijen di Batalion 
(52) dan perwira intelijen pada tingkat Brigade / Divisi (G2), juga 
harus berusaha menggambarkan situasi lokal seperti siapa yang 
berkuasa, siapa yang mengendalikan pemerintahan. Mereka juga 
per1u menguasai bahasa dan budaya setempat, dan tidak hanya 
mengandalkan penterjemah, karena bagaimanapun sangat sulit untuk 
'membeli' sebuah kesetiaan .  
Oleh karena itu, penting untuk mengetahui faktor-faktor seperti 
mengetahui fakta mengenai pecahnya suatu pemberontakan, siapa 
pemimpin sebenarnya, apa yang menjadi latar belakangnya dan 
pelajaran atas konflik-konflik serupa di masa lampau. 
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